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Deciphering Property Insurers’ Indemnification 
Obligations After Disasters, Pandemics and 
Business Interruption Losses: An Analysis of State 
Supreme Courts and Federal Circuits’ Declaratory 
Judgments 
WILLY E. RICE*© 
SYNOPSIS 
Beginning in early 2020, governors from California and Texas to Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, the District of Columbia and 
North Carolina responded to the “novel coronavirus pandemic” and issued stay-at-
home orders. The mandates interrupted small businesses’ “non-essential” operations. 
In the wake, insured businesspersons lost trillions of dollars. After the closures, 
George Floyd died while in police custody. In response, massive and peaceful 
demonstrations occurred in numerous states. Some “opportunistic” protesters looted 
and vandalized already-shuttered businesses. The greater majority of “all-risks” 
property insurers, however, refused to cover the business-interruption losses. 
Ultimately, the businesses filed hundreds of single- and class-action lawsuits. Will 
insured small businesses prevail? There is good and less encouraging news. A 
multivariate empirical study reveals that insureds are substantially more likely to win 
coronavirus business-interruption disputes in state supreme courts rather than in 
federal courts of appeals. But state supreme courts consistently analyze “relevant 
facts on a case-by-case basis” rather than apply pro-insureds legal doctrines to decide 
duty-to-indemnify disputes. Even more importantly, some “relevant factors”—i.e., 
types of insured businesses, types of property risks and states’ objective business-
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climate rankings—are markedly more persuasive and predictive than others. This 
Article discloses and discusses those highly “relevant factors” as well as the 
substantive legal barriers that small businesses and other entities must overcome in 
duty-to-indemnify trials. In the end, the Article encourages arguably thrice-harmed 
businesspersons and their attorneys to weigh carefully the more predictive, 
persuasive and dispositive factors before litigating business-interruption disputes in 
this “age of the coronavirus pandemic.”  
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the mid-twentieth to the early twenty-first century, enormously destructive 
natural and human-caused disasters occurred across the United States.1 Catastrophic 
hurricanes and tropical storms thrashed Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
Louisiana, and Texas.2 Historic and eerily predictable “structural and wildland” fires 
erupted in California and Colorado.3 And “civil commotion, riots and vandalism” 
erupted in the District of Columbia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere during the 
1960s.4  
In 2002, a viral pandemic—the “severe acute respiratory syndrome” (SARS)—
infected persons and contaminated property.5 The purportedly “worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression” occurred in 2008.6 And, during the spring of 2020, 
 
 1. See generally Types of Disasters, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., 
https://www.samhsa.gov/find-help/disaster-distress-helpline/disaster-types (outlining major and yearly natural 
and human-caused disasters that caused catastrophic loss of life and property) (last visited May 21, 2020). 
 2. See generally Hurricane History for the Washington and Baltimore Region, NOAA, 
https://www.weather.gov/lwx/hurricane_history (last updated May 25, 2012); Hurricanes in History, NOAA, 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history (last visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
 3. Fire, Nat’l Park Serv., https://www.nps.gov/subjects/fire/index.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2019). 
 4. See infra Part IV; see also infra notes 217-55 and accompanying discussion of COVID-19-related losses 
and the concurrent causation doctrine. 
 5. See generally Martha C. White, SARS Wiped $40 Billion Off World Markets; What Will Coronavirus 
Do?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020, 2:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/markets/sars-wiped-40-billion-
world-markets-what-will-coronavirus-do-n1122151. 
 6. Ash v. N. Am. Title Co., 223 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1289-90 (2014) (citing Brain R. Cheffins, Did 
Corporate Governance ‘Fail’ During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500 (ECGI 
Working Paper No. 124, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1430325_code512461.pdf?abstractid=1396126&mirid=1). 
See also Varshisky v. Town of Greenwich, 2018 WL 4945010, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2018) (a certified 
appraiser/broker’s disclosing that the real-estate market declined substantially after “the market crash of 2008”). 
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peaceful protests as well as “looting and vandalism”7 swept the country after an 
“unarmed and handcuffed” George Floyd died in Minnesota while in police custody.8 
Unquestionably, those powerful forces destroyed directly or indirectly tangible 
property and generated collectively or independently massive business-interruption 
losses and widespread unemployment.9 Still, as of this writing, a general consensus 
has emerged. The “Global COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020”10 has shaken the global 
economy to its core — generating nationwide stay-at-home orders and interrupting 
the business activities of nearly every commercial, industrial, and professional 
entity.11 Among property insurers, an equally troubling awareness has emerged: 
Trillions of dollars will be needed to cover business-closure losses, which arose 
purportedly from the “coronavirus pandemic.”12  
 
 7. See, e.g., Noah Manskar & Natalie Musumeci, Looters Cost NYC Businesses ‘Tens of Millions,’ Experts 
Estimate, N.Y. Post (June 3, 2020, 8:01 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/06/03/looters-cost-nyc-businesses-tens-
of-millions-experts-estimate. 
 8. See Erin Ailworth, Zusha Elinson, Dan Frosch & Ben Kesling, Floyd’s Death in Custody Draws 
Condemnation From Law Enforcement Officials, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2020, 10:29 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/george-floyd-arrest-death-in-minneapolis-police-custody-spark-more-protests-
11590599760 (reporting that former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin pressed his knee into George 
Floyd’s neck—killing the handcuffed arrestee, triggering nationwide protests and riots, and drawing “rare [and] 
widespread condemnation from police chiefs and officers across the country”). 
 9. Cf. Todd Frankel, Insurers Knew The Damage A Viral Pandemic Could Wreak on Businesses. So, They 
Excluded Coverage, WASH. POST. (Apr. 2, 2020, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/02/insurers-knew-damage-viral-pandemic-could-wreak-
businesses-so-they-excluded-coverage/ (reporting that SARS pandemic produced millions of dollars in business-
interruption losses); Palash Ghosh, What Is Riot Insurance? A Primer On A Unique Financial Product, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (May 28, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/what-riot-insurance-primer-unique-financial-
product-2984321 (discussing business-interruption insurance, and reporting that demonstrations, looting, and 
rioting destroyed business properties and caused financial losses in Minnesota after police killed an unarmed and 
handcuffed arrestee—George Floyd); Kate L. Hyde & Jared Evans, Business Interruption Claims in the Wake of 
the Devastating California Wildfires, KENNEDYS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.kennedyslaw.com/thought-
leadership/article/business-interruption-claims-in-the-wake-of-the-devastating-california-wildfires (reporting 
that deadly and destructive wildfires generated multi-billion dollars claims); see also Galante v. Galante, No. A-
0202-13T4, 2014 WL 8030549, at *1 (N. J. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2015) (business owner asserting that the 2008 
financial crisis caused part of his huge financial losses). 
 10. See Paul S. White & Siobhán A. Breen, The Impact of the Global COVID-19 Pandemic On the Insurance 
Industry, DRI: FOR THE DEF. (Apr. 2020), 
https://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Attorney_Articles_PDFs/ftd-2004-white-breen.pdf (explaining the 
evolution of the “new coronavirus”— Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). 
 11. See generally Ben Winck, The Worst Global Recession Since World War II: Deutsch Bank Just Unveiled 
a Bleak New Forecast as the Coronavirus Rocks Economies Worldwide, Mkts. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2020, 1:51 
PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/coronavirus-recession-worst-wwii-economic-recovery-
global-deutsche-bank-2020-3-1029012757. 
 12. See Jim Sams, Several Insurance Commissioners Wary of Business Interruption COVID-19 Claims, 
Carrier Mgmt. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.carriermanagement.com/news/2020/04/30/206125.htm. 
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Consequently, in the wake of the estimated losses, a highly contentious legal 
question has evolved: Whether commercial property insurers have a contractual 
obligation to indemnify businesspersons who present business-interruption claims.13  
resolve the controversy, businessowners have filed a “tidal wave” of state and federal 
lawsuits—from California and Texas to New York, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Florida  and the District of Columbia.14 As of this writing, COVID-19-
related insurance controversies have generated a somewhat surprising question: 
whether courts are substantially and significantly more likely to decide coronavirus 
business-interruption disputes in favor of insureds or insurers.15 
Arguably, for historical reasons, the answer to this narrow question should be 
easy. First, since the early 1890s, state supreme courts have decided whether property 
insurers must indemnify insureds who present business-loss claims.16 The present 
 
 13. See generally Brett Carey et al., Three Ways Insurance Companies Can Navigate the Surge of COVID-
19 Business Interruption Claims, RISK & INS. (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://riskandinsurance.com/3-ways-insurance-companies-can-navigate-the-surge-of-COVID-19-business-
interruption-claims. 
 14. See generally COVID-19: Insurance Litigation and Regulatory Responses, ALSTON & BIRD, 
https://www.alston.com/en/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/04/20200419-updateCOVID19-business-
interruption-50-st.pdf (last updated Apr. 19, 2020). See also Lyle Adriano, VA Restaurant Sues Insurer Over 
Denial of COVID-19 Business Interruption Claim, INS. BUS. AM. (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/hospitality/va-restaurant-sues-insurer-over-denial-of-covid19-
business-interruption-claim-220462.aspx; CBS 17 Digital Desk, Durham Restaurants File Lawsuit Saying 
Insurance Company Won’t Honor Business Interruption Policies, CBS 17, https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-
news/durham-county-news/durham-restaurants-file-lawsuit-saying-insurance-company-wont-honor-business-
interruption-policies (last updated May 19, 2020, 5:48 AM); Lorraine Mirabella, Baltimore Developer The 
Cordish Cos. Sues Insurer to Recover Pandemic Business Losses, BALT. SUN (Aug. 24, 2020, 5:16 PM), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-cordish-pandemic-lawsuit-insurer-20200824-
kiwvfipfszdvrpixryqyd5zxji-story.html. 
 15. Compare Mark Plevin, Tacie Yoon & Austin Sutta, Companies May Be Thwarted by These Business 
Interruption Defenses, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 13, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-
governance/insight-companies-may-be-thwarted-by-these-business-interruption-defenses (arguing that 
“business interruption” coverage may not be available under commercial property insurance contracts) with 
Tamara Bruno, David Klein & Robert L. Wallan, Many Commercial Property Insurance Policies Provide 
Coverage for COVID-19 Exposures, JD SUPRA (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/many-
commercial-property-insurance-13155/ (citing conflicting judicial decisions and arguing that an “actual or 
threatened coronavirus contamination” of insured’s property is a “physical loss” which triggers business 
interruption coverage). 
 16. See, e.g., Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. W.H. Roberts Lumber Co., 89 S.E. 945, 949 (Va. 1916) (concluding that 
the fire insurer had no duty to indemnify or cover the insured’s lost profit); see also French v. Hope Ins. Co., 33 
Mass. 397, 400 (1835) (declaring that lost profits are insurable interests and ordering the insurer to indemnify the 
insured). 
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business-interruption disputes are essentially duty-to-indemnify disputes.17 Thus, in 
light of state supreme courts’ historical rulings, jurists should be able to reasonably 
infer the likely outcomes of these coronavirus duty-to-indemnify controversies. 
Second, state, as well as federal courts have a rich history of deciding whether 
insurers have a duty to indemnify when “pollutants,” “contaminants,” or “viruses” 
cause lost profits or interrupt business activities.18 COVID-19 is questionably a 
“virus” or “pollutant”—which  contaminates businesses and makes commercial 
properties uninhabitable or unusable for intended purposes.19Thus, given the legion 
of judicial and “on point” contamination rulings, commonsensical inferences about 
the likely outcomes of coronavirus business-interruption  disputes should be 
relatively easy.   
After civil authorities across the country issued stay-at-home orders in early 2020, 
some insureds filed duty-to-indemnify actions in state and federal courts —alleging 
that the orders directly caused lost profits and requesting declaratory relief.20 Under 
the terms of a standard property insurance contract, the “coronavirus pandemic” is 
arguably a “covered” or an “excluded” peril.21 Thus, in light of prior “civil authority” 
controversies and decisions, jurists should be able to make reasonable inferences 
about the likely dispositions of business-interruption disputes in state and federal 
courts.  
Yet, among jurists and insurance experts, there is uncertainty about how state and 
federal courts will decide coronavirus indemnification claims.22 Why? Immediately 
 
 17. See e.g., Pacific Coast Eng’g Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124 (Cal. App. 
Ct. 1970) (reaffirming that the purpose of business interruption insurance is to indemnify an insured whose 
property causes lost profits). 
 18. See Tamara Bruno, David Klein & Robert Wallan, supra note 15 (discussing courts’ legion of decisions 
surrounding the nexus between physical property loss and viruses and reporting that COVID-19 can survive for 
days on doorknobs, faucets, and other hard surfaces normally considered inhospitable to viruses). 
 19. See Grant Nichols, Is COVID-19 a Covered Pollution Exposure? What to Look for in Your Policy 
Language, RISK & INS. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://riskandinsurance.com/is-covid-19-a-covered-pollution-exposure-
what-to-look-for-in-your-policy-language (citing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s conclusions and 
stressing that COVID-19 is a “pollutant” and viruses are “biological contaminants”). 
 20. See generally Leslie Scism, Coronavirus Costs Weigh on Travelers’ Profit, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2020, 
7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/travelers-posts-lower-profit-as-catastrophe-losses-rise-11587469103; 
see, e.g. Chicago Area Businesses File Suit for Denied Business Interruption Claims, THOMPSON COE (Mar. 31, 
2020), https://www.thompsoncoe.com/publications/chicago-area-businesses-file-suit-for-denied-business-
interruption-claims/ (discussing claims filed by Chicago businesses alleging that Society Insurance Inc. is legally 
obligated to indemnify them from lost business income when the businesses were forced to close as a result of 
COVID-19).  
 21. See infra Part III.B; see also infra notes 127-53. 
 22. See Todd Frankel, Insurers Knew The Damage A Viral Pandemic Could Wreak On Businesses. So, They 
Excluded Coverage, WASH. POST. (Apr. 2, 2020, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/02/insurers-knew-damage-viral-pandemic-could-wreak-
businesses-so-they-excluded-coverage (reporting insurance experts and regulators’ assessment and stressing that 
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before Floyd’s death, the “coronavirus pandemic” directly or indirectly shuttered 
most businesses and decreased profits.23 However, after Floyd’s death, many of those 
same businesses were damaged, looted or vandalized.24 Consequently, there is 
confusion surrounding whether government orders and the looting were independent 
or concurrent causes of property owners’ lost profits.25  
Therefore, in light of this major controversy, the author decided to complete a 
business-interruption case study that began in 2004 and pen this article.26 Two 
narrow questions were investigated: 1) whether state or federal courts are more 
likely to force property insurers to cover coronavirus business-interruption losses; 
and 2) whether insurance-specific doctrines or settled contract principles are more 
likely to explain courts’ dispositions.27 As of this writing, relatively few courts have 
squarely addressed the first question.28 Nevertheless, inferential evidence strongly 
 
probably most businesses will not receive business-interruption proceeds, even though the novel coronavirus 
indirectly forced the nationwide closure of businesses). 
 23. See Shan Li & Julia-Ambra Verlaine, Manhattan Stores Bolster Security To Ward Off Looting, WALL 
ST. J. (June 1, 2020, 7:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/manhattan-stores-looted-as-protests-continue-over-
death-of-george-floyd-11591015054 (reporting that the coronavirus forced all nonessential businesses to close 
in mid-March, and that “looters [invaded] some of SoHo’s most well-heeled stores” — allegedly protesting the 
death of George Floyd); The Editorial Board, Justice and Disorder, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2020, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-and-disorder-11590959305 (reporting that rioters “in more than 30 cities” 
used “Antifa-like tactics,” promoted violence and looted shops after “the killing of George Floyd”). 
 24. See Shan Li & Julia-Ambra Verlaine, see also The Editorial Board, supra note 23. 
 25. See generally Karen L. Weslowski, Canada: Causation and Concurrent Causes of Business Interruption 
Involving COVID-19, Mondaq (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/canada/operational-impacts-and-
strategy/925526/causation-and-concurrent-causes-of-business-interruption-involving-covid-19; Lavonne 
Kuykendall, Insurers Try To Rebuild Trust, WALL ST. J (June 27, 2007) (observing that coverage lawsuits reveals 
sometimes confusing policy language —like “concurrent causation”—confuses customers and allows property 
insurers to escape liability when both covered and excluded perils cause a property loss). 
 26. In 2004, the Editorial Board of Texas Tech Law Review invited the author to review the Fifth Circuits’ 
insurance decisions. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2004-2005 Disposition of 
Insurance Decisions: A Survey and Statistical Review, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 821 (2006). Among the numerous 
decisions, only one case — Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 313-15 (5th Cir. 
2005) — involved a business-interruption dispute. In Finger, the Fifth Circuit decided in favor of the insurer— 
refusing to award business-interruption damages. Id. However, in Lexington Ins. Co. v. Island Recreational Dev. 
Corp., 706 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App. 1986), the Texas Court of Appeals declared that the insurer had a duty 
to indemnify and cover the insured’s business-interruption losses. Id. Significantly, the facts and applied 
doctrines in Finger and Lexington are nearly identical. Yet, the outcomes are vastly different. This single conflict 
and heightened curiosity motivated the author to conduct a study—reading, analyzing, and coding state and 
federal courts’ business-interruption decisions. 
 27. See infra Part V; see also infra notes 259-62. 
 28. See Gavin Souter, Lawyers File Multiple Class Actions Seeking Virus Coverage, BUS. INS. (Apr. 20, 
2020), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200420/NEWS06/912334128/Lawyers-file-multiple-class-
actions-seeking-coronavirus-coverage-COVID-19; Debra Cassens Weiss, Nearly 300 Federal Suits Stem From 
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suggests: State and federal appellate courts are considerably more likely to issue 
contradictory rather than reasonably predictable business-interruption decisions.29  
Stated simply, it is impossible to understand property-insurance coverage without 
knowing and proving the cause of a loss. And, to complicate matters, there are 
multiple common-law and insurance-specific doctrines of causation. Therefore, Part 
I of the Article explains “property-insurance coverage” and the meaning of 
“causation” —focusing particularly on the doctrines of concurrent causation and 
anti-concurrent causation.  
PART II answers necessarily several important insurance-specific questions: 1) 
whether both “traditional” and “contingent” business interruption claims trigger 
insurers’ duty to indemnify; 2) whether an “interrupted business” is a “covered 
property interest” or a “covered peril;” and 3) whether business-interruption 
insurance covers both tangible and intangible property losses. 
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) provides optional and limited coverage for 
coronavirus interruptions.30 Should businesses purchase “coronavirus insurance?” 
To help answer the question, PART III examines courts’ conflicting declarations and 
discusses the implications for businesspersons who might purchase property 
insurance to cover losses that arise from the coronavirus.  
Again, according to government statistics, a “small percentage of protestors” 
looted and vandalized businesses after George Floyd’s death.31 Therefore, arguably, 
two “covered insurance risks” — the coronavirus and “riotous conduct”— 
concurrently interrupted businesses and caused financial losses. PART IV addresses 
the pressing question: whether property insurers have a duty to cover these types of 
business-interruption losses under the doctrine of concurrent causation. Why is this 
question important? Under commercial property insurance contracts, losses which 
originate from “civil commotion, vandalism, riots or looting” are covered.32 But, 
losses that arise from viruses and bacteria are excluded.33 
 
Pandemic, ABA J. (May 28, 2020, 2:57 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/200-plus-federal-
lawsuits-mention-covid-19-101-business-interruption-cases-filed-whats-next. 
 29. Christopher French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses, 
30 Ga. St. U.L Rev. 461, 497 (2014). Debra Cassens Weiss, supra note 28. 
 30. Insurance Services Office (ISO), VERISK, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/brands/iso (last visited 
June 17, 2020) (stating that the ISO serves property/casualty insurers and provides “policy language” for a broad 
spectrum of commercial and property insurance contracts). 
 31. See Olga Khazan, Why People Loot, THE ATL. (June 2, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/06/why-people-loot/612577  (“Police leaders generally agree 
that only a small percentage of the protesters are looting. . .[B]ut the practice is still undeniably widespread. . .in 
Lower Manhattan, Minneapolis [and] in Los Angeles.”). 
 32. See infra Part IV; see also infra notes 216-263. 
 33. See, e.g., Larry Podoshen, New Endorsements Filed to Address Exclusion of Loss Due to Virus or 
Bacteria, ISO CIRCULAR (July 6, 2006), https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/2020/03/ISO-
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Furthermore, citing anecdotal evidence, consumer-protection and insurance-
defense litigators have suggested: Legal doctrines as well as certain extrajudicial 
factors are likely to influence the dispositions of COVID-related business-
interruption disputes.34 Therefore, PART V presents the findings of an empirical 
study. It evaluates the independent and concurrent influences of litigants’ theories of 
recovery, affirmative defenses and a host of other “relevant factors” on the likely 
outcomes of duty-to-indemnify disputes.  
Ultimately, based on the analysis of courts’ decisions and statistically significant 
findings, the Article strongly encourages businessowners to litigate business-
interruption claims in state rather than federal courts. Generally, insureds are more 
likely to prevail in state courts. Even more impressive, the findings reveal that 
businessowners have the greatest probability of winning duty-to-indemnify claims in 
state courts, which are located in the “top ten, business friendly states.”35 The Article 
also encourages businesspersons to plan for an unsurprising finding: Certain 
“relevant factors or facts”—rather than settled legal principles—are statistically and 
significantly more likely to shape state and federal courts’ conflicting business-
interruption and duty-to-indemnify judgments.36 
II. Property Insurance Contracts and Business-Interruption Coverage   
In the 1940s, the insurance industry began selling a standard comprehensive 
general liability (CGL) insurance contract.37 Basically, a CGL contract provides 
third-party coverage—promising to defend and indemnify against irate customers’ 
personal-injury and property-damage claims.38 Historically, many businessowners 
 
Circular-LI-CF-2006-175-Virus.pdf (reporting that the ISO’s form CP 01 40 07 06 excludes loss or damage 
caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism). 
 34. Cf. Sean Mahoney & Ciaran Way, King’s Bench Petition Seeks to Consolidate All Pennsylvania COVID-
19 Business Interruption Insurance Cases, JD SUPRA (May 5, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/king-
s-bench-petition-seeks-to-22336/ (identifying numerous extralegal factors—i.e., geographic locations, types of 
insurance contracts, types of insured businesses, types of business interruptions, types of “covered and excluded 
perils,” and types of “covered property”—which can influence the dispositions of COVID-related, business-
interruption disputes). 
 35. See generally Part V.D. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Daniel Streim, Policyholders Beware – Cyber Coverage May Provide A False Sense of Security, 
MONDAQ (June 5, 2015), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/insurance-laws-and-
products/402852/policyholders-beware-cyber-coverage-may-provide-a-false-sense-of-security (reporting that a 
favorable market spurred the development of standardized commercial general liability insurance in the 1940s). 
 38. See Business Owners Policy (BOP) — General Liability Plus Coverage For Property, HISCOX, 
https://www.hiscox.com/small-business-insurance/business-owners-policy (last visited June 4, 2020). 




WILLY E. RICE 
 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 9 
mistakenly believe that a CGL insurance contract also covers businessowners’ 
damaged or destroyed property.39  
Briefly put, absent an endorsement or an extended-coverage provision, a standard 
CGL insurance contract does not protect a business entity’s tangible or intangible 
property interests.40 Therefore, if small businessowners want to protect their property 
against various risks, those entities must purchase property insurance—which covers 
third-party liability claims and first-party property-loss claims.”41 
A. Property Insurance and Binding Conditions Precedent — “Covered 
Property” and “Covered Causes of Loss”   
The standard property insurance contract is structured to cover damaged, 
destroyed or loss property.42 However, “coverage” has a highly restrictive 
definition.43 Historically, insurers sold “all-risks” and “specified-risk” contracts.44 
Under specific-risk agreements, insurers promise to indemnify or reimburse only if 
a specific peril causes a property loss.45 On the contrary, all-risks insurers promise to 
insure commercial property against all known, unknown and unanticipated perils.46 
Fairly recently, the insurance industry revised the standard property insurance 
contract—slightly changing the definition of “coverage.”47 It reads in pertinent part: 
“We will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to covered property at the 
premises . . . caused by or resulting from any covered cause of loss.”48  
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Gap, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 11 A.D.3d 108, 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting that 
property insurance is first-party insurance). 
 43. Cf. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989) (stressing that “some of the 
confusion . . . regarding insurance coverage under the ‘all-risk’ section of a homeowner’s insurance policy 
―when [a] loss to an insured’s property [has occurred]― can be attributed to two causes, one . . .which is a no 
excluded peril, and the other an excluded peril.”). 
 44. See Paul S. White & Siobhán A. Breen, The Impact of the Global COVID-19 Pandemic On the Insurance 
Industry, DRI: FOR THE DEF. (Apr. 2020), 
https://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Attorney_Articles_PDFs/ftd-2004-white-breen.pdf (discussing “all-
risks” and “specific-risk” contracts and citing judicial decisions). 
 45. See, e.g., Poulton v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Cos., 675 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Neb. 2004) (reaffirming that 
under a specific perils policy, an insured’s personal property is covered if one of the listed perils in the contract 
damaged the property). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Robert J. Prahl, Be Aware of Recent Revisions to ISO Commercial Property Coverage Forms, E-
EDITION ADJUSTING TODAY, https://www.adjustersinternational.com/pubs/adjusting-today/be-aware-of-recent-
revisions-to-iso-commercial-property-coverage-forms/2/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
 48. Standard Property Policy, CP 00 99 04 02, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c471ba9620b85081a7025cc/t/5c800b5824a6943bea56819c/1551895385




Deciphering Property Insurers’ Indemnification Obligations After Disasters, 
Pandemics and Business Interruption Losses 
 
10 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
What is a “covered property”? The standard contract gives an exceedingly long 
and arguably ambiguous definition. In relevant part, it reads: “Covered property . . . 
means the type of property described in this section: . . . (a) [T]he building or 
structure described in the Declarations, . . . [and] (b) Your business personal 
property located in or on the building described in the Declarations . . . within 100 
feet of the described premises.”49   
What is a “covered cause of loss”? Generally, insurers will cover the risk of a 
“direct physical loss, unless the loss is excluded or limited in the policy.”50 Consider, 
for example, several highly relevant and italicized perils which often appear in the 
contract:  
The following covered causes of loss do not apply unless riot or civil 
commotion . . . is [listed] in the Declarations . . .. Riot or civil commotion 
[includes] acts of . . . looting occurring at the time and place of a riot or 
civil commotion.51 
 
The following covered cause of loss does not apply unless vandalism is 
[listed] in the Declarations. . . . Vandalism [means] willful and malicious 
damage to or destruction of the described property. We will not pay for 
loss or damage . . . to glass . . . that is part of a building, structure, or an 
outside sign. [B]ut we will pay for . . . damage to other property . . . 
resulting from breakage of glass by vandals.52 
B. Commercial Property Insurance and Competing Doctrines of Causation  
There are numerous common-law and statutory theories of causation. For 
example, before receiving various damages awards under tort and contract-based 
theories of recovery, insurance consumers as well as other complainants must prove 
 
174/MANDATORY+CP+00+99+04+02+STANDARD+PROPERTY+POLICY.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 
2020). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Robert J. Prahl, Be Aware of Recent Revisions to ISO Commercial Property Coverage Forms, E-EDITION 
ADJUSTING TODAY, https://www.adjustersinternational.com/pubs/adjusting-today/be-aware-of-recent-revisions-
to-iso-commercial-property-coverage-forms/4/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
 51. Standard Property Policy, supra note 48. 
 52. Id. at 4. 
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cause-in-fact,53 foreseeability causation, and/or conventional proximate cause.54 To 
prevail under various deceptive-trade-practices and consumer-protection statutes, 
insurance consumers and other aggrieved parties must prove that a violation was the 
producing cause of an injury and damages.55  
Nevertheless, before satisfying any common-law or statutory theory of causation, 
insureds must prove that a “covered peril” directly caused their “physical property 
damage.”56 Which burden of causation must insureds satisfy before courts order 
insurers to indemnify? Insureds must prove that a “covered peril” was the dominant 
efficient cause,57 the efficient proximate cause,58 or the efficient producing cause59 
of the destroyed property.   
C. The Doctrines of Concurrent Causation and Anti-Concurrent Causation  
Perhaps, most jurists remember the “pertinent facts” and holding in Summers v. 
Tice — “a staple of the first-year law-school curriculum.”60 In the course of hunting 
quail, Harold Tice and Ernest Simonson focused their aims on a quail and pointed 
the guns in the direction of Charles Summers.61  Both shotguns were simultaneously 
 
 53. See, e.g., McDonald v. Bedford Datsun, 570 N.E.2d 299, 301-02 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (requiring proof 
of cause in fact and proximate cause). 
 54. Auto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilini Ford, Inc, 854 A.2d 378, 385-86 (N.J. 2004); Frontline 
Processing Corp. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 149 P.3d 906, 909-11 (Mont. 2006); Scirex Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 313 
F.3d 841, 850 (3d Cir. 2002); FDIC v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 205 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Jefferson Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 1274, 1281-82 (3d Cir.1992). See also, UDR Tex. 
Properties, L.P. v. Petrie, 517 S.W.3d 98, 107 (Tex. 2017) (“Proximate cause and producing cause share the 
common element of causation in fact, with proximate cause including the additional element of foreseeability.”). 
 55. See, e.g., UDR Tex. Properties 517 S.W.3d at 107 (“To recover . . . under a products liability theory 
requires proof of producing causation”) (Willett, J., concurring); Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House, 106 520 
A.2d 162, 166-67 (Conn. 1987) (discussing producing cause, Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, and 
consumers’ remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 56. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989) (“‘Coverage . . . is commonly 
provided by reference to causation―e.g., “loss caused by” certain enumerated perils. The term “perils” in 
traditional property insurance parlance refers to fortuitous, active, physical forces such as lightning, wind, and 
explosion, which bring about the loss. Thus, the “cause” of loss in the context of a property insurance contract is 
totally different from that in a liability policy.’”); Source Food Tech. Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 465 F.3d 834, 
837-38 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Minnesota’s law and explaining the parameters of a “direct physical loss”). 
 57. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971) (discussing both the dominant 
cause and concurrent causation doctrines). 
 58. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. 1989) (noting that “efficient proximate 
cause” is an insurance-law doctrine). 
 59. See Leadership Real Estate v. Harper, 638 A.2d 173, 182-83 (N.J. Super Ct. 1993) (explaining the 
doctrine of efficient producing cause). 
 60. Kyle Graham, A Second Look at Summers v. Tice, CSCHS Newsletter (Cal. Sup. Ct. Historical Soc’y), 
Fresno, CA), 2020 at 15. 
 61. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1-2; see also id. 
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discharged. One shot injured Summers’ eye and the other damaged his upper lip. 
Weighing the tortfeasors’ “concerted action,” the California Supreme Court applied 
a concurrent causation doctrine and declared: Two or more parties are jointly liable 
if their negligent acts combine and cause the same loss.62  
Even before the tort-based ruling in Summers, state supreme courts applied a 
contract-based concurrent causation doctrine to assess whether property insurers had 
a duty to indemnify.63 Generally, if covered and excluded perils concurrently cause 
property damage, the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured for the percentage 
of loss arising from the covered peril.64 The minority position states: Insurers must 
cover an insured’s total loss if the covered and excluded perils sequentially, 
simultaneously or concurrently caused the same property damage.65 
In the early 1980s, insurers’ ire increased markedly after courts began to apply 
the minority rule.66 In response, the Insurance Services Office (ISO) crafted, and 
insurers adopted, an anti-concurrent causation (ACC) provision. Currently, the 
clause appears in the standard commercial property insurance contract67 and reads in 
relevant part: 
We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of 
the following [excluded perils: an ordinance or law, . . . government 
action, . . . and fungus-mold]. . . . Such loss or damage is excluded 
 
 62. Summers, 199 P.2d at 5. 
 63. See, e.g., Mammina v. Homeland Ins. Co., 21 N.E.2d 726, 728-29 (Ill. 1939) (performing a concurrent 
causation analysis and ruling in favor of the insured); Warmcastle v. Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co., 50 A. 941, 
941 (Pa. 1902) (performing a concurrent causation analysis and ruling in favor of the insurer). 
 64. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. 1971) (performing a concurrent 
causation analysis, requiring insureds to segregate covered and noncovered property losses and requiring the 
insurer to reimburse the insured for the covered losses). 
 65. See Colella v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 407 F. Appx 616, 622 (3d Cir. 2011) (allowing the insured 
to recover even though an excluded peril contributed to the loss); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 554 
(9th Cir. 1982) (allowing the insured to recover even though an excluded peril contributed to the loss). See also, 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123, 130 (Cal. 1973) (declaring that coverage under a 
liability insurance policy is available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent 
proximate cause of the injuries). 
 66. See Joseph S. Harrington, Concurrent Causation: An Adjuster’s Dilemma, ADJUSTING TODAY, 
https://www.adjustersinternational.com/pubs/adjusting-today/concurrent-causation-new/2/ (last visited June 16, 
2020) (discussing several 1980s concurrent causation decisions which prompted the Insurance Services Office 
(ISO) to fashion a standard anti-concurrent causation provision). 
 67. Id. at 2. 
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regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in 
any sequence to the loss. . . .68 
II. PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE, INTANGIBLE LOSSES, AND THE BUSINESS 
INTERRUPTION THEORY OF RECOVERY 
Until this point, the term “business interruption” has been used cavalierly—
without focusing squarely on specific business losses or damages. It is important to 
stress, however, that courts have fashioned a “business interruption theory of 
liability.”69 Typically, before a tribunal awards business-interruption damages, an 
insured must prove five elements: 1) the damaged property is a “covered property;” 
2) a “covered peril” or “covered cause of loss” produced the damage; 3) the peril 
caused physical damage; 4) the peril caused a specific and quantifiable loss; and 5) 
the interruption occurred during a specific time period.70  
First, consider the Business Income and Extra Expense Coverage Endorsement 
(BIEE). It reads in pertinent part: 
We will pay for the actual loss of business income. . .due to the necessary 
“suspension” of your “operations” during the “period of restoration.” 
The “suspension” must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to 
property at premises which are described in the Declarations. . . . The 
loss or damage must be caused by or result from a covered cause of loss. 
71 
Basically, the language in the BIEE provides first-party insurance coverage for an 
insured’s lost profits.72 Or stated slightly differently, if a covered risk damages or 
destroys an insured’s physical property and the destruction interrupts the insured’s 
 
 68. See Standard Commercial Property Insurance Form —CP 00 99 04 02, supra note 52, at 9-10. See also, 
Harrington, supra note 66, at 5 (stating that “after decades of legal wrangling and policy adjustments, . . . the ISO 
[developed] Special Form— (CP 10 30 10 12)). 
 69. See generally, Cosmetics Plus Grp. v. Am. Int’l Grp. (In re Cosmetics Plus Grp.), 379 B.R. 464, 470 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that “any claim for losses under a business interruption policy requires an 
analysis of . . . several elements.”); Kate Hyde & Jared Evans, Business Interruption Claims in the Wake of the 
Devastating California Wildfires, KENNEDYS LAW, LLP (Jan. 23, 2019) https://www.kennedyslaw.com/thought-
leadership/article/business-interruption-claims-in-the-wake-of-the-devastating-california-wildfires (identifying 
the elements). 
 70. Kate Hyde & Jared Evans, Business Interruption Claims in the Wake of the Devastating California 
Wildfires, KENNEDYS LAW, LLP (Jan. 23, 2019) https://www.kennedyslaw.com/thought-
leadership/article/business-interruption-claims-in-the-wake-of-the-devastating-california-wildfires. 
 71. Business Income and Extra Expense Coverage Form—CP 00 30 04 02 
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/file/CP00300402.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
 72. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992). 
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business, the insurer must indemnify the insured.73 A second amendment—the 
Business Income From Properties Endorsement (BIFDP)—allows insureds to 
receive cumulative damages. It reads:  
We will pay for the actual loss of business income you sustain due to the 
necessary “suspension” of your “operations” during the “period of 
restoration.” The “suspension” must be caused by direct physical loss of 
or damage to “dependent property” at a premises described in the 
Schedule caused by or resulting from a covered cause of loss.74 
What is a “dependent property”? The term refers to a third party’s property.75 For 
example, a “supply chain” of goods, materials, and components spans the globe, 
allowing retailers and local sellers to purchase goods from those suppliers.76 
However, in the course of events, natural forces, pandemics and human-caused 
disasters can destroy suppliers’ property.77 And those interruptions can severely 
undermine sellers’ business operations. 
Upon first inspection, the BIFDP arguably provides third-party rather than first-
party insurance coverage. But a closer scrutiny reveals that the BIFDP modifies the 
BIEE and extends first-party coverage.78 The modification is called contingent 
business interruption insurance (CBI).79 Fundamentally, under the BIFDP, an insurer 
promises to pay additional damages, if a covered peril physically damages or 
destroys a supplier’s property and the destruction partially or completely suspends 
the insured-seller’s operations.80 
As of this writing, most courts have not determined the precise scope of insurers’ 
duty to indemnify after insureds present traditional and contingent business-
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Business Income From Dependent Properties – CP 15 09 06 07, 
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/file/CP%2015%2009%2006%2007.pdf (last visited June 
22, 2020). 
 75. Id. (stating that “‘[d]ependent property’ means property operated by others whom you depend on to . . . 
a) deliver materials or services to you or to others for your account . . . b) accept your products or services . . . c) 
manufacture products for delivery to your customers under contract of sale . . . or d) attract customers to your 
business.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Fed. Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 1279, 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(explaining contingent business interruption insurance); CII Carbon, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of La., 
Inc., 918 So.2d 1060, 1064, 1069 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the difference between traditional and 
contingent business interruption insurance).  
 80. Arthur Andersen LLP, 3 A.3d at 1282. 
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interruption claims.81 In fact, only a few reported cases have construed the meaning 
of contentious terms in the BIEE and BIFDP.82 Nevertheless, among the small 
number of judicial decisions, a major disagreement has emerged. Both the BIEE and 
BIFDP require insureds to prove that a “necessary suspension” occurred.83 But, what 
is a “necessary suspension”? Courts in several states—California, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Texas, and Washington—have declared: A “necessary suspension” 
means the total interruption or complete cessation of an insured’s business 
operations.84 Also, applying states’ insurance-specific rules, several federal courts 
have required insureds to prove a total or complete cessation of business activities.85 
On the other hand, a few state and federal courts have allowed insureds to collect 
business-interruption damages after proving only a partial suspension of business 
operations.86 
 
 81. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc., 397 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 82. See Pentair, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 83. See Baxter Int’l., Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d 263, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) 
(stressing that an insurer is liable only if a covered peril causes a physical property loss or damage and the latter 
causes a necessary interruption of business). 
 84. See e.g., Buxbaum v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 688, 690-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) (requiring proof of a business’s total cessation rather than slowdown, but finding that the law firm 
continued its operation at a different location); Simkins Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 181, 191 
(Md. App. 1979) (finding a total suspension of business operations); Forestview The Beautiful, Inc. v. All Nation 
Ins. Co., 704 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (requiring proof of a business’s complete cessation); 54th 
St. Ltd. Partners, L.P. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 763 N.Y.S.2d 243, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (requiring proof 
of a business’s total interruption or cessation); Quality Oilfield Prods., Inc., v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d 
635, 639 (Tex. App. 1998) (requiring proof of a business’s “cessation or suspension” rather than a “slowdown”); 
Keetch v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring the complete cessation 
of the insured motel’s room services). 
 85. See, e.g., Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2015 DNH 110 *5 (requiring the total “closure 
of premises” after a “covered crisis event”); Apartment Movers of Am., Inc. v. Onebeacon Lloyd’s of Tex., No. 
3:04-CV-0278-B, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 695, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2005) (holding that “a business slowdown 
is not sufficient to invoke coverage under a business interruption policy”); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Creative 
Walking, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1065-66 (E.D. Mo.1998) (declaring that the policy required a total rather than 
partial cessation of business activity); Royal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Mikob Props., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 155, 160 (S.D. 
Tex. 1996) (rejecting the insured’s business-interruption-loss claim after finding that a fire completely destroyed 
only one of three apartment buildings); Home Indem. Co. v. Hyplains Beef, L.C., 893 F.Supp. 987, 991 (D. Kan. 
1995) (declaring that the plain meaning of “necessary suspension” requires a “complete cessation” of business 
operations). 
 86. See, e.g., Studley Box & Lumber Co. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 154 A. 337, 337-38 (N.H. 1931) (declaring 
that the policy expressly allowed for a partial suspension of operations and allowing the business to recover after 
a fire destroyed a stable); Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 224 P.3d 960, 966-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
only a “partial suspension” of a casino’s operation and ordering the insurer to indemnify); Lite v. Fireman’s Ins. 
Co., 104 N.Y.S. 434, 435-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907) (awarding lost profits even though a fire only partially 
damaged the covered property); Am. Med. Imaging Corp. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 
692-93 (3d Cir. 1991) (allowing a recovery of damages for a partial cessation of operations after a fire caused 
some physical damaged).   
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A third endorsement—Business Owner Coverage Endorsement (BOCE)87—also 
allows businessowners to collect supplementary lost-profit damages when a civil 
authority order interrupts business activities. In relevant part, the BOCE states: 
We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income . . . and necessary 
Extra Expense caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access to 
the described premises due to direct physical loss of or damage to 
property, other than at the described premises, caused by or resulting 
from any Covered Cause of Loss. . . .88 
Significantly, the BIEE also covers losses that arise from the effects of 
government orders—mirroring several key words and phrases that appear in the 
BOCE.89 The BIEE reads in pertinent part: 
When a covered cause of loss causes damage to property other than 
property at the described premises, we will pay for the actual loss of 
business income . . . caused by action of civil authority that prohibits 
access to the described premises, provided that . . . (1) access to the area 
immediately surrounding the damaged property is prohibited by civil 
authority . . . and (2) the action of civil authority is [a] response to 
dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage . . . of the 
covered cause of loss.90 
III. INSURERS’ CONFLICTING INDEMNIFICATION OBLIGATIONS AFTER 
PANDEMICS, DISASTERS, AND BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES 
Again, in early 2020, economists reported three relevant facts: 1) Small-to-
medium-sized businesses generated approximately half of all private sector jobs in 
the United States;91 2) The COVID-19 pandemic permanently closed 100,000 small 
 
 87. See Businessowners Coverage Form - BP 00 03 07 02, http://freeclaiminfo.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/FCI0128-BP-00-03-01-06-Businessowners-Coverage-Form.pdf (last visited June 27, 
2020). 
 88. Id. at 8. 
 89. Business Income and Extra Expense Coverage Form — CP 00 30 06 07, 
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/file/CP 00 30 06 07.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
 90. Id. at 2. 
 91. Heather Long, Small Business Used To Define America’s Economy. The Pandemic Could Change That 
Forever, WASHINGTON POST, (May 12, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/12/small-business-used-define-americas-economy-
pandemic-could-end-that-forever/ (citing researchers at the University of Illinois, Harvard Business School, 
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businesses;92 and 3) Dentists, owners of dining and entertainment venues as well as 
many healthcare professionals and retailers experienced the greatest losses.93 Thus, 
given the pandemic’s purportedly extensive effects, it is not surprising that small-
businessowners have filed the majority of business interruption lawsuits.94 But, 
reconsider the timely question: Are insurers or insureds more likely to prevail in 
COVID-related business-interruption actions? Alternatively, are courts more or less 
likely to force property insurers to indemnify insureds? 
In light of courts’ historical duty-to-indemnify analyses and decisions, three 
predictions have emerged: 1) In state and federal trial courts, insurers are 
significantly more likely to win the majority of COVID-related lawsuits; 2) In state 
and federal appellate courts, business entities are more likely to win the majority of 
business-interruption disputes; and 3) Unrelenting judicial splits are likely to 
influence insureds and insurers’ probability of winning coronavirus lost-profit 
disputes in appellate courts. To be sure, these three business-interruption questions 
have produced judicial disagreements—even though state and federal courts 
consistently apply the same legal, equitable and insurance-specific doctrines in 
declaratory judgment actions.95 Necessarily, those substantive issues and doctrines 
are discussed below. Moreover, to help explain the stubborn controversies, the 
probative facts in a few recently filed coronavirus-related, business-interruption 
lawsuits are included in the analysis. 
A. Indemnity Insurance Conflict — Whether “Viruses” and “Contaminants” 
Are Covered or Excluded Perils Under Pollution Exclusion Clauses  
To begin, consider the “most relevant facts or factors” in L.H. Dining v. Admiral 
Indemnity Company.96 LH-Dining, LLC owns and operates a restaurant in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.97 Between March and April 2020, the Governor of 
 
Harvard University and the University of Chicago and reporting that at least 2 percent of small businesses —
more than 100,000 — have shut permanently since the pandemic escalated in March 2020). 
 92. Id. (“The carnage has been even higher in the restaurant industry, where 3 percent of restaurant operators 
have gone out of business, according to the National Restaurant Association.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Thomas Franck, Hardest-Hit Industries: Nearly Half the Leisure and Hospitality Jobs Were 
Lost in April, CNBC (May 8, 2020, 11:14 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/08/these-industries-suffered-
the-biggest-job-losses-in-april-2020.html. 
 94. See generally COVID-19: Insurance Litigation and Regulatory Responses, ALSTON & BIRD, 
https://www.alston.com/en/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/04/20200419-updateCOVID19-business-
interruption-50-st.pdf (last updated Apr. 19, 2020), 
 95. See infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 96. Complaint, LH Dining L.L.C. v. Admiral Indem. Co., No. 2:20-cv-01869 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2020), ECF. 
No. 1, 2020 WL 1817073. 
 97. Id. ¶ 9. 
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Pennsylvania and the Mayor of Philadelphia ordered “non-life-sustaining and non-
essential businesses” to close.98  
In late 2019, LH-Dining purchased an “all-risk property insurance contract” from 
Admiral Indemnity Company.99 Under the terms of a BIEE endorsement, Admiral 
promised to cover business interruption losses if 1) a “covered cause of loss” forced 
local or state governments to issue a civil order, and 2) the order prevented an insured 
and its customers from accessing the insured’s business property.100 The insurance 
contract also contained an Exclusion of Loss Due to Virus or Bacteria provision 
which reads in relevant part:  
Paragraph A—[This endorsement modifies the commercial property 
coverage. The exclusion in Paragraph B] applies to all coverage under 
all . . . endorsements . . . that cover property damage to buildings or 
personal property and . . . endorsements that cover business income, 
extra expense or action of civil authority. 
Paragraph B—We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting 
from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is 
capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.101 
 
LH-Dining asked Admiral to pay business-interruption damages, arguing that 1) 
The exclusion clause did not preclude a recovery of lost profits;102 2) COVID-19 is 
“an ever-present risk;”103 and 3) The civil orders caused “a substantial loss of 
business income.”104 Citing language in the exclusion clause, Admiral rejected LH-
Dining’s claim and LH-Dining petitioned the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania 
for declaratory relief.105 
 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 25–31. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 11, 17. 
 100. Id. ¶ 16. 
 101. Admiral Indem. Co.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Exhibit 1 at 80, LH Dining L.L.C. v. 
Admiral Indem. Co., No. 2:20-cv-01869 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2020), ECF. No. 18-3 (emphasis added); see also ISO 
Props., Inc., Exclusion of Loss Due to Virus of Bacteria Form—CP 01 40 07 06, N. STAR MUT. INS. CO. (2006), 
https://northstarmutual.com/UserFiles/File/forms/policyforms/Current/CP%2001%2040%2007%2006.pdf. 
 102. Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 19. 
 103. Id. ¶ 34. 
 104. Id. ¶ 38. 
 105. Id. ¶¶ 41–44. 
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Briefly, the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act of 1934106 and the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act of 1922107 allow litigants to petition state and federal 
courts for equitable relief. Typically, an “interested party” asks a court to interpret a 
written contract and explain the affected party’s rights.108 To resolve insurance 
disputes, state courts have created and applied five doctrines to interpret insurance 
contracts and endorsements.109 Generally, when state courts apply the doctrines of 
adhesion, ambiguity or reasonable expectation, insureds are more likely to receive 
declaratory relief.110 In contrast, insurers are more likely to secure favorable 
declarations when courts apply the plain-and-ordinary-meaning rule or the traditional 
rules of contract construction and interpretation.111 
Returning to the dispute in L.H. Dining and weighing the “relevant facts” in the 
light of the five doctrines, should the Pennsylvania Eastern District Court rule in 
favor of the restaurant owner? The simple answer is yes. Arguably, the coverage 
provision is despairingly convoluted and ambiguous.112 Moreover, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has been extremely clear: Ambiguous contractual terms must be 
construed against the insurer.113 On the other hand, the insurer should prevail because 
 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2018) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the 
United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration 
. . . . Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable 
as such.”); see also Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability Insurers 
Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of 
Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments —1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1144 (1998) (outlining 
questions that federal courts must consider before awarding declaratory relief: (1) whether judgment would settle 
a controversy, (2) whether declaration would clarify legal relations, (3) whether a judgment would increase 
friction between federal and state courts, and 4) whether an alternative or more effective legal remedy exists). 
 107. UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 2, 12A U.L.A. 6 (2008) (allowing an interested person to 
petition a court for relief and giving courts the power to construe various rights, statuses, or other legal relations 
under a written instrument); see also Rice, supra note 106, at 1142–1143 (discussing the history and purpose of 
the act, outlining a court’s discretionary and declaratory powers, and emphasizing that an appellate court may 
not reverse a trial judge’s declaration unless the lower court abused its discretion). 
 108. Rice, supra note 106, at 1144. 
 109. See generally id. at 1162-65 (explaining the five doctrines as: the rules of contract construction; the 
doctrine of ambiguity; the doctrine of plain meaning; the doctrine of reasonable explanation; and the doctrine of 
adhesion). 
 110. Id. at 1163–65. 
 111. Id. at 1162–64. 
 112. Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 16 (“Under the Policy, insurance is extended to apply to the actual loss of 
business income sustained and the actual, necessary and reasonable extra expenses incurred when access to the 
Insured Property is specifically prohibited by order of civil authority as the direct result of a covered cause of 
loss to property in the immediate area of Plaintiffs’ Insured Property.”). 
 113. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (stressing that 
“contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to 
a particular set of facts.”). 
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the insured admits that COVID-19 is a virus and the insurance contract plainly 
excludes compensation for a virus-related business loss.114  
Still, there are two remaining issues which require a more engaged analysis. First, 
epidemiologists generally agree: COVID-19 is a “disease” or an “illness” and not a 
“virus.”115 The so-called “novel coronavirus” or “severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2” —SARS-CoV-2— is a “virus”; and it purportedly causes COVID-
19.116 Thus, should the L.H. Dining court force Admiral to indemnify the 
businessowner, if the court embraces the prevailing view that COVID-19 is an 
“illness?” The highly probable answer is yes—if the court applies the plain-and-
ordinary-meaning rule or construes the assertedly ambiguous virus-exclusion clause 
against Admiral.  
But consider: Many businessowners purchase both property and commercial 
general liability (CGL) insurance.117 Therefore, a court’s commonsensical answers 
to the questions above can become more challenging. Under CGL insurance 
contracts, insurers also promise to indemnify if a covered peril destroys an insured’s 
tangible property or prevents the insured from accessing or using the property.118 
Even more relevant, CGL policies usually include an “absolute” or “total” pollution 
exclusion.119 The industry-wide Total Pollution-Contamination Exclusion 
Endorsement reads:  
This insurance does not apply to . . . (1) the contamination of any 
environment by pollutants . . . [or to] (2) any . . . property damage arising 
out of such contamination. . . . Pollutant means any irritant . . . solid, 
liquid, gaseous or thermal contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, 
 
 114. LH Dining Complaint, supra note 96, ¶¶ 21, 37; LH Dining Contract Exhibit, supra note 101, at 80; see 
also ISO Props., Inc., supra note 101. 
 115. Translating COVID-19, “co,” “vi,” “d,” and “19” mean corona, virus, disease and 2019, respectively. 
See, e.g., David J. Cennimo, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), MEDSCAPE, 
https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/2500114-overview (Sept. 16, 2020) (explaining the difference between 
the virus and disease); Marios Koutsakos & Katherine Kedzierska, A Race to Determine What Drives COVID-
19 Severity, 583 NATURE 366, 366 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01915-3 (“The 
coronavirus known as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) . . . and certain aspects 
of the disease it causes — COVID-19 — continue to baffle clinicians and researchers.” (emphasis added)). 
 116. Cennimo, supra note 115. 
 117. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of N.Y. v. Cohoes Realty Assocs., 854 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(disclosing that the insured purchased two types of coverage: commercial general liability insurance (CGL) and 
business owners’ property insurance). 
 118. See Wausau Business Ins. Co. v. Idleaire Techs. Corp. (In re Idleaire Techs. Corp.), No. 08-51227, 2009 
WL 413117, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 18, 2009) (outlining the history of the absolute and total pollution 
exclusion clauses in commercial liability insurance contracts). 
 119. Id. at *6. 
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fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. As used in this endorsement, 
. . . contamination means any unclean or unsafe damaging or injurious 
or unhealthful condition arising out of the presence of pollutants, whether 
permanent or transient.120 
Once more, LH-Dining clearly admitted that COVID-19 probably 
“contaminated” and “would continue to contaminate” the restaurant.121 And, the 
SARS virus causes COVID-19. Therefore, assume that LH-Dining insured its 
property under both CGL and property-insurance contracts. Should the federal 
district court still construe the virus exclusion clause against Admiral and in favor of 
LH-Dining? Is SARS a “pollutant” or “contaminant” under Admiral’s virus 
exclusion clause? To be sure, definitive answers to these questions are elusive. Why?  
The Supreme Courts of California, Illinois and New Jersey122 as well as the 
Second and Seventh Circuits only apply the pollution exclusion to resolve disputes 
involving “traditional environmental contamination.”123 Therefore, if the Eastern 
District Court of Pennsylvania embraces the same practice, the Court would probably 
force Admiral to cover LH-Dining’s COVID-19-related, business-interruption 
losses. Other state and federal courts, however, have interpreted the CGL pollution 
exclusion more broadly and concluded: A virus—like “solid, liquid, gaseous or 
thermal contaminants”—is a “pollutant.”124 Consequently, LH-Dining would be 
 
 120. Id. at *2. 
 121. Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 34. 
 122. See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1211, 1217 (Cal. 2003) (refusing to apply the 
pollution exclusion to pesticide spraying in an apartment building, “which do[es] not remotely resemble 
traditional environmental contamination”); Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 869 A.2d 929, 930 (N.J. 
2005) (limiting the application of the pollution exclusion to “traditional environmental pollution” and refusing to 
apply it after the release of toxic fumes from a floor coating/sealant); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 
72, 82 (Ill. 1997) (restricting the application of the pollution exclusion to “traditional environmental 
contamination” and refusing to apply the exclusion after the accidental release of carbon monoxide from a 
furnace). 
 123. See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jabar, 188 F.3d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting the view that a “pollutant” 
means “any . . . irritant or contaminant” since most substances or chemicals can “irritate or damage a person or 
property”); see also Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 124. See, e.g., Larson v. Composting Concepts, Inc., No. A07-976, 2008 WL 2020489, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 13, 2008) (concluding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify after applying the pollution exclusion and 
finding that mold, bacteria, and bioaerosols from a compost site were organic contaminants); Assicurazioni 
Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1005–06 (4th Cir. 1998) (declaring that the pollution exclusion was 
unambiguous and applying it to resolve a non-traditional environmental pollutant); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of 
Warren, 87 F. App’x 485, 487, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2003) (declaring that the pollution exclusion precluded a 
recovery of insurance proceeds after pathogens, and all strains of viruses in sewage infiltrated homes and caused 
health problems); First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. GRS Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., No. 08-81356-CIV, 2009 WL 2524613, 
at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2009) (concluding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify after applying the 
pollution exclusion and finding that Coxsackie virus in a swimming pool was a viral contaminant); Evanston Ins. 
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precluded from receiving coronavirus-related damages, if the Eastern District Court 
of Pennsylvania adopts this latter view. Perhaps, the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
observation in Porterfield v. Audubon Indemnity Company,125 can provide some 
guidance:  
Rarely has any issue spawned as many . . . rationales and . . . court 
decisions as . . . the pollution-exclusion clause. . . [More than 100 cases 
support] the proposition that the plain language of the pollution-
exclusion clause [denies] coverage. . . . [There is] not just a split of 
authority, but an absolute fragmentation of authority. . . . [Often, cases 
that reach] the same conclusion [about] a particular issue [give 
different], and sometimes inconsistent . . . rationales.126  
B. Indemnity Insurance Conflict — Whether “Viruses” or “Contaminants” 
Cause Physical Property Damage 
To begin the analysis in this section, consider a few pertinent questions: Did the 
1979 release of radiation from Pennsylvania’s Three Miles Island nuclear power 
plant (TMI)127 physically destroy or damage commercial and residential structures? 
Did the radiation contaminate tangible materials? Did the radiation cause business-
interruption losses? Did commercial and residential property insurers compensate 
insured business entities and homeowners after the radiation damaged “physical 
property?” Were the TMI owners strictly liable for releasing radiation? A careful 
reading of the Supreme Court’s remarkable analysis in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group128 suggests that the answer to each question is yes.129  
 
Co. v. Harbor Walk Dev., LLC, 814 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding pollution exclusions 
unambiguous and not limited to traditional environmental pollution), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Evanston Ins. 
Co. v. Germano, 514 F. App’x 362 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 125. 856 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2002). 
 126. Id. at 800 (emphasis added). 
 127. See Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 532 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. 1987) (discussing the uncertainties arising 
from the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island), aff’d sub nom. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 
(1989); Aaron M. Datesman, Radiobiological Shot Noise Explains Three Mile Island Biodosimetry Indicating 
Nearly 1,000 mSv Exposures, SCI. REPS. (July 2, 2020) https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-67826-
5.pdf (reporting that the nuclear-power station released a large quantity of the radioactive gas). 
 128. 438 U.S. 59 (1978), superseded by statute, Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
408, 102 Stat. 1066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 129. Id. at 64–74 (disclosing that the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) requires the nuclear industry to purchase indemnity insurance, and 
the industry is strictly liable and must indemnify property owners after a release of “non-natural radiation” 
damages third parties’ physical property). 
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Hence, would the universal answer to the above questions change dramatically if 
“coronavirus” or “COVID-19” were substituted for “radiation?” To help answer this 
latter question, consider the probative facts in 837 Foothill Blvd., LLC v. Travelers 
Indemnity Co. of Connecticut.130 Foothill, LLC owns and manages a small business 
center in Los Angeles County, California.131 In March 2020, the Governor of 
California and the Mayor of Los Angeles issued stay-at-home orders—instructing all 
“non-essential” businesses to close.132 Foothill’s tenants stopped using the 
commercial units and paying rent—citing purportedly “dire risks” associated with 
COVID-19 and alleging that COVID-19 physically damaged a nearby third party’s 
commercial property.133 
In November 2019, Foothill and Travelers Indemnity Company executed an “all 
risks” property insurance contract—covering the center’s physical property and 
operations.134 Under the terms of a BIEE endorsement, Travelers promised to 
indemnify Foothill for “business income losses.”135 Ultimately, Foothill asked 
Travelers to pay business-interruption damages—citing the shutdown’s 
“unprecedented scale,” “substantial loss of business income” and “additional 
expenses.”136 The insurer refused—asserting that the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) did 
not directly and physically damage the center or cause business-interruption 
losses.137  
Eventually, Foothill filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of 
California. The insured argued that Travelers had a duty to indemnify.138 The BIEE 
endorsement, however, does not define “physical loss or damage”—even though the 
phrase appears sixteen times.139 As of this writing, the central question before the 
Superior Court is whether the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) can directly and 
physically cause a “property loss” or “property damage.” Should the Superior Court 
interpret the clause in favor of Foothill? The probable answer is yes, if the Court 
 
 130. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 837 Foothill Blvd., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 
20STCV13929 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2020), 2020 WL 1818437. 
 131. Id. ¶ 1. 
 132. Id. ¶ 17. 
 133. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. 
 134. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 12; see also Cross-Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Demand for Jury Trial Exhibit A at 
15-16, 837 Foothill Blvd., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 20STCV13929 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 
2020), 2020 WL 6049435; cf. ISO Props., Inc., Business Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage Form—CP 00 
30 04 02, MERLIN L. GRP. (2001), https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/file/CP00300402.pdf 
(industry standard form providing substantially similar coverage). 
 135. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 130, ¶¶ 6, 9. 
 136. Id. ¶ 21. 
 137. See id. ¶ 23. 
 138. COMPLAINT—837 Foothill Blvd., Id., paragraph 15. 
 139. See ISO Props., Inc., Business Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage Form—CP 00 30 04 02, PROP. 
INS. COVERAGE L. BLOG (2001), https://www.propertyinsurancecovproperty.com/files/file/CP00300400.pdf. 
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allows the introduction of “relevant” extrinsic evidence to help define the meaning 
of those terms.  
Several state supreme courts allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to help 
interpret insurance contracts.140 In the complaint, Foothill argued that the coronavirus 
physically damages and destroys property141—like, say, the released radiation at 
TMI’s nuclear power plant. Generally, the World Health Organization (WHO)142 and 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)143 maintain that the coronavirus 
contaminates tangible materials and objects. Foothill argued that SARS-CoV-2 
destroys tangible property by contaminating the surfaces of objects and remaining 
there “up to twenty-eight days.”144 If the superior court embraces WHO’s definition 
of a virus-caused “physical loss or damage,” Foothill will probably prevail. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of California and other supreme courts have 
been exceptionally clear about another matter: Judges must determine the 
reasonable expectation of the average insured when interpreting the meaning of 
words and phrases in an insurance contract.145 Moreover, to afford the greatest 
possible protection for the average insurance consumer, California courts interpret 
 
 140. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 861 P.2d 1153, 1159–60 (Cal. 1993) (allowing 
any extrinsic evidence to interpret contractual terms and the scope of an insurer’s obligations); Chubb Custom 
Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285, 1289 (N.J. 2008) (permitting lower courts to weigh 
extrinsic evidence if an ambiguity exists and contractual terms are “susceptible to at least two reasonable 
alternative interpretations”); State v. Home Indem. Co., 486 N.E.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. 1985) (“If . . . the language 
in the insurance contract is ambiguous and susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the parties may submit 
extrinsic evidence [to help construe the contract].”). 
 141. Complaint, supra note 130, ¶ 15. 
 142. See Jason Gale & Ari Altstedter, How Can I Get It? The Evidence on Virus Transmission, WASH. POST 
(July 8, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/businesb/how-can-i-get-it-the-evidence-on-virus-
transmission/2020/06/30/44df4b98-baab-11ea-97c1-6cf116ffe26c_story.html (reporting that researchers, 
reviewed by The World Health Organization, aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 and discovered that “fomites” can 
contaminate physical surfaces—i.e., doorknobs or utensils—and linger for “weeks in near-freezing temperatures” 
or “survive as long as 24 hours on cardboard, 48 hours on stainless steel, and 72 hours on plastic”). 
 143. See Pien Huang, Malaka Gharib & Natalie Jacewicz, Essential Vocab for COVID-19: From 
Asymptomatic to Zoonotic, WBUR NEWS (June 27, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/npr/883975628/essessess-
vocab-for-covid-19-from-asymptomatic-to-zoonotic (reporting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
research findings and disclosing that “fomites”—virus-contaminated physical objects—possibly could transmit 
the coronavirus). 
 144. Complaint, supra note 130, ¶ 15. 
 145. See, e.g., La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 1048, 1053–54 (Cal. 1994); 
Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med. & Physical Therapy, 46 A.3d 1272, 1277 
(N.J. 2012) (requiring lower courts to interpret coverage clauses broadly to satisfy 
insured’s reasonable expectations); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 965 N.E.2d 934, 936 (N.Y. 
2012) (instructing lower courts to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the average insured). 
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coverage provisions broadly and construe the exclusionary clauses narrowly.146 
Therefore, if the Superior Court applies the doctrine of reasonable expectation, 
Travelers probably will have to indemnify Foothill and pay business-interruption 
damages. 
Still, it is important to emphasize: State and federal courts within California are 
divided over the meaning of “physical damage.” For example, in MRI Healthcare 
Ctr. of Glendale, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,147 a California Appellate Court 
declared that a “repaired” MRI machine’s failure to “turn on” or “ramp up” was not 
a “physical loss.”148 The court of appeals stressed: A direct physical loss must be an 
actual change in an insured’s property—precluding the owner’s use of the property 
and requiring the owner to repair it.149 However, in Total Intermodal Services v. 
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America,150 a federal district court in 
California rejected the MRI court’s analysis and conclusion. The federal court 
declared that two lost or misplaced containers of printers were “physical losses” 
under the insurance contract—even though the cargo was not physically damaged.151 
Also, beyond California, state supreme courts and the federal circuits are seriously 
divided over the meaning of “physical loss or damage.” For example, courts in 
Colorado, New Jersey and Oregon have applied the doctrine of plain-and-ordinary-
meaning as well as the ambiguity doctrine and declared: Physical property losses 
occur when a release of ammonia, gasoline fumes, foul-smelling odors, mold-
infestation, or asbestos fibers physically contaminate structurally sound buildings.152 
Other state supreme courts, however, have applied the same doctrines and declared: 
A mold-contaminated—but architecturally sound—residential or commercial 
 
 146. MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1213 (Cal. 2003) (citing White v. W. Title Ins. Co., 710 
P.2d 309, 313 (Cal. 1985)). 
 147. 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 148. Id. at 37–38. 
 149. Id. (citing AFLAC Inc. v. Chubb & Sons, Inc., 581 S.E.2d 317, 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 150. No. CV 17-04908 AB (KSx), 2018 WL 3829767 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2018). 
 151. Id. at *3–4. 
 152. See Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 2:12–cv–04418 
(WHW)(CLW), 2014 WL 6675934, at *6–8 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (applying the ambiguity doctrine and 
concluding that the release of ammonia physically transformed the air in the facility and caused the property to 
be temporarily unfit for occupancy); W. Fire Ins. Co. v. First Presbyterian Church, 437 P.2d 52, 55-56 (Colo. 
1968) (deciding as a matter of law that a “direct physical loss” occurred after gasoline contamination made 
further use of a property highly dangerous); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Or. Ct. App. 
1993) (concluding that a methamphetamine lab’s pervasive odor physically damaged a house); Prudential Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lillard–Roberts, No. CV-01-1362-ST, 2002 WL 31495830, at *8-9 (D. Or. June 18, 
2002) (applying the plain meaning rule and holding that a “‘direct’ and ‘physical loss’” may occur when mold 
contaminates and makes a property uninhabitable); Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 
226, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying the plain-and-ordinary-meaning doctrine and declaring that a physical loss 
occurs when asbestos contaminated a building—making it uninhabitable or unusable). 
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property is not “physically damaged.”153  It is highly probably that travelers will not 
have to cover Foothill’s business-interruption losses, if the California Superior Court 
concludes that the coronavirus cannot alter the physical integrity of a commercial 
property.  
C. Indemnity Insurance Conflict — Whether A Civil Authority Order Can 
Cause Business-Interruption Losses 
In early 2020, the insurance commissioners of Georgia, Maryland, North 
Carolina, the District of Columbia and several smaller states revealed: 1) Each 
month, COVID-related business losses range between $255 and $431 billion dollars; 
and 2) more than 194,000 insurance contracts promise to cover business-interruption 
losses that arise from civil authority orders.154 Yet, the overwhelming majority of 
property insurers will not cover any coronavirus-related losses.155 
Certainly, whether an insurer has a duty to compensate insureds for coronavirus 
business losses is a question of law for a court.156 Still, the commissioners’ chilling 
assessment might be correct. Why? Debatably, it is extremely difficult for an insured 
to prove a causal nexus between a COVID-related government order and a business-
interruption loss. Therefore, to highlight the challenges that insureds are likely to 
confront in a duty-to-indemnify trial, consider the “relevant facts” and substantive 
issues in two remarkable and highly instructive Virginia court cases.  
In L & L Logistics and Warehousing Inc., v. Evanston Insurance Co.,157 Markel 
Corporation (Markel) is an insurance holding company; and Evanston Insurance 
Company (Evanston) is Markel’s subsidiary.158 Respectively, these entities are 
located in Richmond and Glen Allen, Virginia.159 The insured —L & L Logistics and 
 
 153. See Universal Image Prods., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 475 Fed. App’x 569, 572-75 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying 
Michigan’s plain-and-ordinary-meaning doctrine and declaring that the mold contamination was not a “direct 
physical loss or damage”); Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 884 N.E.2d 1130, 1141, 1144–45 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2008) (applying the plain-and-ordinary-meaning doctrine and declaring that mold contamination is not 
a “physical loss” because mold does not alter or affect a property’s structural integrity); Columbiaknit, Inc. v. 
Affiliated FM Ins. Co., No. Civ. 98-434-HU, 1999 WL 619100, at *4–5, *7 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 1999) (applying the 
ambiguity doctrine and requiring “distinct and demonstrable” physical damage from mold contamination). 
 154. Jim Sams, Several Insurance Commissioners Wary of Business Interruption COVID-19 Claims, 
CARRIER MGMT. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.carriermanagement.com/newn/2020/04/30/206125.htm. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Intercept Youth Servs., Inc. v. Key Risk Ins. Co., No. 3:18cv901, 2019 WL 1810988, at *2 (E.D. 
Va. Apr. 24, 2019). 
 157. No. 3:20-cv-324, 2020 WL 2213290 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2020). 
 158. See Complaint, L & L Logistics & Warehousing Inc., 2020 WL 2213290, ¶¶ 9–10. About Markel, 
MARKEL, https://www.markel.com/about-markel (last visited Sept. 18, 2020); Our Insurance Companies, 
MARKEL, https://www.markel.com/about-markel/our-insurance-companies (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 
 159. Complaint, supra note 158, ¶¶ 9–10. 
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Warehousing Inc, d/b/a L.L. Trucking Company (Logistics) —is located in 
Hawthorne, California.160 Logistics owned at least one truck, employed at least one 
driver, and provided transportation services.161 More relevant, Logistics also 
operated a trucking school on its premises.162 
 Logistics purchased an “all-risks” property insurance contract from Evanston.163 
The original contract covered business-interruption claims between April 17, 2019 
and April 17, 2020.164 However, when multiple insurance commissioners across the 
United States were predicting dire business-interruption losses in April 2020, 
Logistics renewed its insurance contract.165 Several phrases in Evanston’s policy 
mirror previously highlighted and discussed phrases which appear in the standard 
Business Owner Coverage Endorsement (BOCE)166 and Business Income and Extra 
Expense Endorsement (BIEE).167 Evanston’s contract states: 
[Insurance is extended and applies] to the actual loss of business income 
. . . and the actual, necessary and reasonable extra expenses incurred 
when access to the insured property or other properties are specifically 
prohibited by order of civil authority as the direct result of a covered 
cause of loss to property in the immediate area of [the] insured 
property.168 
A few weeks before the contract’s renewal, the State of California issued a stay-
at-home order.169 Citing the coronavirus and its purportedly devastating effects, the 
government order prohibited all gatherings and forced all non-essential businesses to 
close. 170 Logistics stopped its operations. And, although Evanston’s contract 
contained a virus-exclusion clause, the trucking company sent a notice of loss to 
Evanston.171 The property insurer refused to indemnify.172 In response, Logistics 
 
 160. Id. ¶ 8. 
 161. L&L Trucking, QUICK TRANSP. SOLS. INC., 
https://www.quicktransportsolutions.com/truckingcompany/california/l-l-trucking-usdot-2668351.php (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2020). 
 162. Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 38. 
 163. Id. ¶¶ 11, 16. 
 164. Id. ¶ 11. 
 165. Id. 
 166. ISO Props., Inc., Businessowners Coverage Form—BP 00 03 07 02, PAC. COAST E&S INS. SERVS. 
(2001), http://pacificcoastes.com/assets/bp-00-03-07-02.pdf. 
 167. ISO Props., Inc., supra note 89. 
 168. Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 15 (emphasis added). 
 169. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. ¶ 13. 
 172. Id. 
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filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia.173 Before, the Federal District Court, Logistics raised various and arguably 
novel business-interruption claims.174  
First, Logistics asserted that California’s civil order precluded customers from 
purchasing Logistics’ services—thereby increasing the trucking company’s lost 
profits.175 As discussed earlier, sellers of goods and services depend on a network of 
suppliers.176 But, various disasters, natural forces and pandemics can destroy 
suppliers’ goods and interrupt sellers’ operations.177 Nevertheless, an insured seller 
may secure compensation for contingent business losses if 1) the seller purchased a 
BUSINESS INCOME FROM DEPENDENT PROPERTIES ENDORSEMENT (BIFDP),178  2) the 
insured establishes that a “covered risk” physically damaged the suppliers’ property, 
and 3) the third-party destruction suspended the insured’s business and generated lost 
profits. 179  Apparently, Logistics raised a “contingent business interruption” theory 
of recovery. And if that is true, the company probably will not prevail. Arguably, 
under the reported facts, Logistics cannot satisfy each element of this theory. 
Logistics’ second claim is equally novel and surprising: The “[c]oronavirus global 
pandemic” and California’s stay-at-home order caused the trucking company’s 
financial losses.180 Applying Virginia law,181 the Eastern District of Virginia Court 
probably will summarily dismiss this argument. Put simply, California’s stay-at-
home order exempts persons who provide essential services.182 And, under federal 
 
 173. Id. ¶ 1. 
 174. Complaint, supra note 158, ¶¶ 13, 42–44. 
 175. Id. ¶¶ 28, 32–33. 
 176. See Derek Royster & Christian Skodczinski, Contingent Business Interruption (Supply Chain 
Disruption), INT’L INS. F. (June 20, 2016), http://www.internationalinsuranceforum.cco/prop/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/1IIF-2016_RGL-Forensics_CBI.pdfx_.pdf; see also, Protecting your Business Against 
Contingent Business Interruption and Supply Chain Disruption, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/article/protecting-your-business-against-contingent-business-interruption-and-supply-chain-
disruption (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). 
 177. Protecting your Business Against Contingent Business Interruption and Supply Chain Disruption, supra 
note 175. 
 178. ISO Props., Inc., supra note 74. 
 179. Id. (emphasis added) 
 180. Id. ¶ 2. 
 181. See Buchanan v. Doe, 431 S.E.2d 289, 291 (Va. 1993) (declaring that under Virginia rules, “the law of 
the place where an insurance contract is written and delivered controls issues as to its coverage”) (citing Lackey 
v. Virginia Sur. Co., 167 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1969)). 
 182. Cal. Exec. Order No. N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER-03.19.2020-002.pdf (ordering all 
individuals living in California to stay home “except as needed to maintain continuity of operations of the federal 
critical infrastructure sectors, as outlined at [the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency’s website]”) 
(emphasis added); see also Identifying Critical Infrastructure During COVID-19, CYBERSECURITY & 
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regulations, transportation enterprises are “essential businesses” and truck drivers 
provide “essential services.”183 Conceivably, the Federal District Court would want 
to know why Logistics voluntarily suspended its trucking services and asked 
Evanston to pay business-interruption damages. 
Logistics also operated a trucking school on its premises.184 Therefore, the 
company alleged that California’s executive order forced the school to close.185 
Undoubtedly, whether the trucking school provided an “essential service” is a 
question of law for the court.186 However, applying Virginia’s law, the Eastern 
District of Virginia Court has already answered the question: Under California and 
Virginia’s coronavirus orders, instructional institutions —like the trucking school — 
do not provide essential services.187 Thus, will the Federal District Court force 
Evanston to pay insurance proceeds to ensure the “long-term survivability” of the 
trucking school?”188 Three reasons preclude a definitive answer.  
First, reconsider several key phrases and conditions present in Evanston’s civil-
authority clause. The insurer promised to pay business-loss damages, if 1) a civil 
authority order “prohibited access” to a “covered property,” or 2) a government order 
“prohibited access” to a third party’s property; and 3) a “covered cause of loss” 
damaged or destroyed the third party’s property “in the immediate area” of the 
insured’s property; and 4) A lack of access to an insured’s property caused 
“necessary and reasonable” expenses”189 
Citing similar phrases in the standard civil authority provision, courts have 
embraced a so-called “direct nexus” test. 190 The test comprises multiple elements 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/identifying-critical-infrastructure-
during-covid-19. 
 183. Rachel Premack, Truck Drivers Have Emerged as Some of the Most “Essential” Workers of the 
Coronavirus, but They’re Not Getting Paid Like It, BUS. INSIDER (May 11, 2020, 9:47 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/truck-driver-pay-essential-coronavirus-workers-2020-5 (reporting that nearly 
400,000 U.S. truck drivers own and operate their trucks and the typical rate to take a truckload of goods from 
North Carolina to Los Angeles plummeted from $4,700 to $2,700 two months after stay-at-home orders were 
issued). 
 184. See Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 38. 
 185. Id. ¶¶ 28, 38. 
 186. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65, 78 (1938) (requiring that a federal district court apply 
the choice of law rules of the forum state —Virginia—when jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the litigants). 
 187. Cf. In re Extension to the Modifications of Ct. Operations: Supplement to Gen. Ords. 2020-02 & 2020-
03, No. 2:20mc7, 2020 WL 1441770, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2020) (confirming that California’s “stay home” 
orders closed all non-essential businesses, disclosing that Virginia’s orders closed all K-12 schools, and stressing 
that Virginia’s executive orders allow the government to punishment violators). 
 188. Complaint, supra note 157, at ¶ 38. 
 189. Id. at ¶ 15 (emphasis added). 
 190. See, S. Hosp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 1137, 1141 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying the plain-
and-ordinary-meaning doctrine and declaring that the policy requires an insured to prove a direct nexus between 
the civil authority order and the suspension of the insured’s business); Dickie Brennan & Co. v. Lexington Ins. 
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and conditions precedents. Thus, before Logistics can receive business-interruption 
damages, the company must prove a direct and causal nexus between California’s 
stay-at-home order and the trucking school’s lost profits. Stated another way, 
Logistics must prove that certain perils and events—surrounding a third party’s 
destroyed or damaged property—occurred in a very precise sequence and prevented 
students-customers from accessing the school.191  
In light of the reported facts, Logistics probably cannot prove that California’s 
order “prohibited access” to the trucking school. But it is important to stress: The 
phrase “prohibited access” has generated split decisions among state courts as well 
as inter-circuit splits among federal courts. For instance, applying the doctrine of 
ambiguity, a New York state court declared that post-9/11 traffic restrictions did not 
prohibit partners and associates from accessing a law-office building.192 Applying 
the same doctrine, a federal district court in Louisiana also reached a similar 
conclusion.193 However, applying the plain-and-ordinary-meaning rule, the Virginia 
Supreme Court declared that aviation officials’ post-9/11 traffic restrictions 
prohibited the insured from accessing their commercial property.194  
Courts are also divided over whether government riot-mitigation orders produce 
business-interruption losses by prohibiting customers from accessing the insureds’ 
commercial establishments. To illustrate, a federal court in California applied the 
plain-and-ordinary-meaning rule and declared that a riot-deterrence order did not 
 
Co., 636 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the doctrine of plain-and-ordinary-meaning and concluding that 
the insureds failed to demonstrate a nexus between any prior property damage and the local government’s 
evacuation order); Not Home Alone, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 1:10-CV-54, 2011 WL 13214381, at *5–
6 (E.D. Tex., Beaumont Division, Mar. 30, 2011) (applying the plain-and-ordinary-meaning doctrine and 
declaring that the civil authority provision requires the insured to prove a nexus between the civil authority order 
and certain physical property damage). 
 191. See Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP v. Chubb Corp., No. 09–6057, 2010 
WL 4026375, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 2010) (reaffirming that the civil authority provision requires the insured 
to establish that a sequence of events occurred and prove that a nexus exists between a civil authority order and 
certain physical property damage— which prohibits access to the insured property). 
 192. See Abner, Herrman & Brock, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 308 F.Supp.2d 331, 336–337 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(applying the ambiguity doctrine and declaring that a 9/11 order did not result in “prohibited access” to the 
insured’s business after the no-access order was lifted and vehicular traffic continued to restrict access in the 
area). 
 193. See 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. Assurance Co. of Am., No. Civ.A. 02-106, 2002 WL 31996014, at 
*1–2 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2002) (applying the doctrine of ambiguity and declaring that the FAA’s flight 
cancellations did not prohibit consumers from accessing the insured’s hotels in New Orleans). 
 194. PMA Capital Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 369, 373 (Va. 2006) (applying the plain-and-
ordinary-meaning rule and embracing the argument that airport authorities’ orders prohibited the insured 
commercial airliner from using the airport). 
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prevent customers from accessing the insured’s theater.195 But, a state court in 
Michigan applied the doctrines of ambiguity and plain meaning—declaring that the 
governor’s riots-preemptive action prevented customers from accessing the insured’s 
business and caused lost profits.196 
 Finally, assuming that Logistics’ probative evidence satisfies every element of 
the “direct nexus” test, the insurer can still cite the Virginia Supreme Court’s well-
reasoned analysis in PBM Nutritional’s, LLC v. Lexington Insurance Co.,197 and raise 
an immensely powerful, multi-pronged virus- or contaminant-exclusion defense: As 
a matter of law, Evanston has no duty to indemnify, because 1) SARS-CoV-2 is a 
novel coronavirus, 2) a virus cannot physically damage a property, 3) a physically 
damaged property must cause a business-interruption loss, and 4) the insurance 
contract contains a virus exclusion clause.198 
To help prove the assertion, consider the relevant facts in Nutritionals. PBM 
manufactures and produces Profylac baby formula.199 Basically, the formula is a 
mixture of hot water and dry ingredients.200 PBM’s mixture system comprises several 
components— a filter housing, tubes, a butterfly valve, and a heat exchanger.201 The 
filter contains melamine—a dangerous and toxic contaminant.202 In the course 
events, PBM used superheated water to clean the system, which reduced the filters 
to cellulose.203 After the baby formula was produced, samples revealed that 
melamine leached into the water supply and contaminated the formula.204 
To cover its operations, PBM purchased an “all risk” insurance contract through 
a “quota share” agreement where Lexington and two other insurers “shared 
percentages of the risk of coverage.”205 The contract contained an exclusion clause—
 
 195. Syufy Enters. v. Home Ins. Co. of Ind., 1995 WL 129229, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar.21, 1995) (applying 
the plain-and-ordinary-meaning rule and concluding that a dusk-to-dawn civil authority order —following the 
Rodney King verdict — did not specifically prohibit access to a Syufy theater). 
 196. Sloan v. Phx. of Hartford Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 434, 436–437 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (applying the 
ambiguity and plain meaning doctrines and concluding that the governor riots-related order closed of all places 
of amusement—prohibiting access and directly causing lost profits). 
 197. 724 S.E.2d 707, 708 (Va. 2012). 
 198. Complaint, supra note 157, at ¶ 13. 
 199. PBM, 724 S.E.2d. at 710. 
 200. Id. at 709–710. 
 201. Id. at 710. 
 202. See generally, Christine Ro, It’s Time To Think About Alternatives To Melamine —Which May Be In 
The Plate You’re Using Right Now, FORBES SCIENCE (Nov. 29, 2019, 1:15 PM) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinero/2019/11/29/its-time-to-think-about-alternatives-to-melamine-which-
may-be-in-the-plate-youre-using-right-now/#5c0e36fa3964PBM. 
 203. PBM, 724 S.E.2d at 710. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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barring the recovery of insurance proceeds if a “pollutant” caused a loss.206 
Significantly, under the exclusions, “contaminants” and “viruses” were pollutants.207 
Still, disregarding the exclusionary language, PBM destroyed the contaminated 
formula and sent a notice of loss to each insurer. The manufacturer demanded 
compensation—alleging that the “all risks” contracts covered business-interruption 
loss.208 Lexington and two other insurers denied the claim—asserting that the 
contaminant-exclusion clauses precluded PBM’s recovery.209 
PBM commenced a declaratory judgment action in a Virginia circuit court. First, 
under standard pollution-exclusion clauses, the insurers promised to indemnify even 
if a contaminant causes a business loss. However, the pollution-exclusion provisions 
in several endorsements disclosed that proceeds were precluded if a virus or 
containment causes a loss. PBM argued that the allegedly conflicting clauses should 
be construed against the insurers.210 PBM also argued: Before refusing to indemnify, 
the insurers had a contractual duty to prove conclusively that melamine contaminated 
the Profylac baby formula.211 
The circuit court declared that the property insurers did not have a duty to cover 
PBM’s “contamination losses”— after examining the “pollution exclusion 
endorsement” and applying the ambiguity doctrine.212 Refusing to accept the lower 
court’s declaration, PBM appealed. Before the Supreme Court of Virginia, PBM 
maintained that the lower court’s rulings were erroneous.213 Applying the doctrine of 
plain-and-ordinary-meaning, the Nutritionals court disagreed. Citing various 
stipulations and expert testimony, the supreme court found that the infant formula 
was contaminated.214 But even more importantly, the Nutritionals court declared: 
Viruses as well as traditional and non-traditional environmental contaminants are 
excluded perils under the “all risks” insurance contracts.215  
Returning to the facts in L & L Logistics, Evanston’s insurance contract included 
a virus-exclusion clause. SARS-CoV-2 is a viral contaminant.216 Moreover, Logistics 
 
 206. Id. at 711. 
 207. Id. at 711–712. 
 208. Id. at 710. 
 209. PBM Nutritional’s, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 724 S.E.2d 707, 709 (Va. 2012). 
 210. Id. at 712. 
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 215. PBM Nutritional’s, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 724 S.E.2d 707, 714 (Va. 2012). 
 216. See generally Saeed Behzadinasab et al., A Surface Coating that Rapidly Inactivates SARS-CoV-2, 31 
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admits that the “novel coronavirus” contaminated its California trucking school and 
caused business-interruption losses.217 Yet, Logistics insists that Evanston has a duty 
to indemnify. Debatably, if the Eastern District of Virginia Court embraces the 
Virginia Supreme Court’s persuasive business-interruption analysis in Nutritionals, 
the California trucking company will not prevail. 
IV. CORONAVIRUS BUSINESS CLOSURE ORDERS, “RIOTOUS LOOTING” AND 
INSURERS’ DUTY TO INDEMNITY UNDER THE CONCURRENT CAUSATION 
DOCTRINE  
To repeat, in mid-March 2020, government officials in twenty-two jurisdictions 
responded to a “novel coronavirus pandemic” and issued mandatory stay-at-home 
orders.218 Among other effects, businesses shuttered and began to lose money.219 
Two months later, small groups of allegedly “outside agitators and opportunists” 
responded to George Floyd’s death by vandalizing and looting various businesses in 
major markets.220 Therefore, an important legal question has emerged: whether 
property insurers must indemnify insured small businesses as well as upscale 
retailers if the insureds’ already-shuttered businesses were looted.221 Stated more 
 
inactivates virus that causes COVID-19, MEDICAL XPRESS (July 15, 2020), 
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 218. See Christopher J. Boggs, Coronavirus (COVID-19): Does Business Income Respond?, INS. J. (Mar. 24, 
2020) (“As of this writing, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
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 219. See generally Thomas Wade, Coronavirus and Business Interruption Insurance Coverage, AM. ACTION 
F. (April 14, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/coronavirus-and-business-interruption-
insurance-coverage/. 
 220. See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, Broken Glass, Broken Dreams: Small Businesses Ravaged by Protests and 
COVID-19 Contemplate An Uncertain Future, USA TODAY (June 16, 2020, 3:49 PM), 
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 221. See, e.g., Claire Wilkinson, Riot Losses Mount—Pandemic Complicates Lost Income Claims, BUS. INS. 
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narrowly, the question is whether insurers must compensate businessowners, if 
“looting” and coronavirus orders concurrently caused business-interruption losses. 
To help uncover a plausible answer, consider the dispute in Chefs’ Warehouse v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.222 The Chefs’ Warehouse Inc. (Chefs) is a family of 
companies and a major supplier—distributing “specialty products to over 35,000” 
high-end restaurants, stores, casinos, hotels, and resorts across the United States and 
Canada.223   
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Liberty Mutual Holding Company. Although, its principal place of business is in 
Massachusetts, Liberty offers services in the State of New York.224 Under its all-
risks, Premier Property ProtectorTM insurance contract, Liberty agreed to indemnify 
Chefs if covered risks caused property, business-interruption and account-receivable 
losses.225 Liberty’s limit of contractual liability was $75 million per loss.226 
 Between mid-March and early-April 2020, civil authorities in New York, 
California, Illinois and Washington, D.C. ordered all non-essential businesses to 
close.227 Chefs’ customers —who operate businesses in those venues—complied. 
Consequently, Chefs’ sales and income abruptly declined. Thus, on April 29, 2020, 
Chefs sent a notice of loss—asking the insurer to indemnify.228 Three business days 
later, Liberty rejected the claim.229   
On June 23, 2020, Chefs commenced a declaratory-judgment action in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.230 Before the federal court, Chefs 
asserted that Liberty had a duty to indemnify and gave several reasons: 1) The civil 
orders precluded Chefs’ customers from paying millions of dollars in accounts 
receivables; 2) The market value of its “specialty goods” inventory diminished 
significantly after the government orders; 3) The civil authority orders and 
customers’ delinquent accounts are covered perils; and 4) The covered perils directly 
and indirectly interrupted Chefs’ income within several profitable markets.231 
Again, Liberty rejected Chef’s duty-to-indemnify request within three days. Why? 
In its denial letter, the insurer asserted: 1) A “peril insured against” did not physically 
 
 222. Complaint, Chefs’ Warehouse Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-4825, 2020 WL 3444003 
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2020). 
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damage any of Chefs’ property; and 2) A “peril insured against” did not produce any 
physical property damage—which caused government authorities to issue SARS-
CoV-2-related orders.232 Responding to these defenses, Chefs insisted: Accepting 
that a civil-authority order and the “novel coronavirus” are respectively excluded and 
covered perils, they concurrently caused Chefs’ business-interruption losses.233 
 Will the Southern District of New York embrace Chefs’ concurrent-causation 
theory and force Liberty to indemnify? Perhaps, the answer depends in part on 
whether the federal district court applies 1) the anti-concurrent-causation exclusion 
in Liberty’s insurance contract,234 or 2) the Texas Supreme Court’s widely cited 
analysis235 and rulings in Travelers Indemnity Company v. McKillip.236 First, 
consider the “relevant facts” in McKillip. The McKillips—husband and wife— 
owned a turkey farm and used several small buildings to breed turkeys.237 Travelers 
insured the small business.238 The property insurance contract read in pertinent part: 
[This policy insures the property against a] direct loss resulting from any 
of the perils . . . listed: . . . windstorm, hurricane, hail, explosion, riot, 
civil commotion, smoke, aircraft and land vehicles. . . . Unless 
specifically named [in this policy], this company shall not be liable for 
loss . . . by snowstorm.239 
On a fateful day, “a tremendous wind” damaged two barns.240 Six days later, one 
of the damaged structures collapsed after a snowstorm.241 Travelers refused to 
indemnify. The McKillips commenced a breach-of-contract action. Although finding 
that “other causes may have contributed to” the destruction, the jury concluded that 
a windstorm was the dominant efficient cause of the collapsed building.242 The jury 
awarded the fair market value of the destroyed building and Travelers appealed. 
Before the Texas Supreme Court, the insurer argued that the trial court gave an 
erroneous jury charge.243 The supreme court agreed. Under Texas’s concurrent 
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causation doctrine, an insurer must pay only a certain percentage of loss that arose 
from a covered peril if both covered and excluded perils combine and cause a loss. 
The McKillips, therefore, had to segregate covered losses from excluded losses.244 
On multiple occasions, the Southern District of New York has compared Texas 
and New York’s insurance-specific doctrines and concluded that the two sets of rules 
are nearly identical.245 Even more importantly, the same federal district court has 
cited and applied McKillip— implicitly embracing the Texas Supreme Court’s 
concurrent causation analysis.246 Thus, if the Southern District of New York applies 
McKillip and New York’s law to resolve the dispute between Chef and Liberty, the 
insurer or insured will have to segregate and proved covered and excluded losses.247  
On the other hand, Chefs will probably be disappointed —as it can only receive a 
certain percentage of business-loss damages under the doctrine of concurrent 
causation.248 Furthermore, that disappointment probably will be exacerbated, if the 
district court applies the language in Liberty’s standard anti-concurrent causation 
(ACC) exclusion. In relevant part, the exclusion reads: 
We do not cover physical loss or damage directly or indirectly caused by 
or resulting from any of the following [eight perils] regardless of any 
other cause or event, whether or not insured under this policy, 
contributing to the loss concurrently or in any other sequence.249  
“Government action” is one of eight excluded perils under the standard ACC 
clause.250 But, as disclosed earlier, a “civil authority order” is a covered peril under 
 
 244. Id. at 162–63. 
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and New York and using terms like “accord,” “similar,” “agreement,” and “same” to underscore that the two sets 
of rules are nearly mirror images of each other). 
 246. Stonewall Ins. Co., 1992 WL 123144, at *18 (citing McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160). 
 247. Stonewall Ins. Co., 1992 WL 123144, at *18 (“Under New York law, an insurer [must demonstrate] that 
a particular exclusion applies to bar coverage. Under Texas law, . . . an insured [must] show that [an] occurrence 
did not fall within the exception.”) (citing Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981); see 
also McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1971)). 
 248. Complaint ¶ 69, The Chef’s Warehouse Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-4825, 2020 WL 3444003 
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2020) (explaining that disappointment will likely arise if Chefs means 100% compensation 
for a loss-of-income claim: “Concurrent causation [occurs] when a loss is brought about through a combination 
of two or more potential causes. If one of the concurrent causes is covered, there is coverage under the policy”) 
(emphasis added). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Marianne Bonner, Concurrent Causation and Anti-Concurrent Causation—Many Property Policies 
Exclude Concurrent Causation, THE BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/concurrent-and-anti-concurrent-causation-462346. 
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the Premier Property ProtectorTM insurance agreement.251 And clearly, the COVID-
19-related directives in New York, Illinois and California involve “government 
action.” Thus, Chefs’ ability to secure any business-interruption compensation will 
probably become exceedingly more difficult if the Southern District Court of New 
York applies the ACC exclusion. Why? To repeat, the New York Court of Appeals 
and the greater majority of state courts have enforced ACC provisions.252 And a 
conservative reading of the current ACC exclusion suggests: Liberty has no duty to 
indemnify because a government “coronavirus pandemic” order caused Chefs’ losses 
“regardless of any other” concurrent or contributing cause.253  
There is one final point. In late-May 2020, various upscale and shuttered 
businesses in New York City, Chicago the District of Columbia, Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco were looted and/or vandalized. 254 These are the “major markets” in 
which Chefs sold “high-end” specialty goods and lost substantial profits.255 As 
reported, the property insurance contract in McKillip as well as most property 
insurance contracts insure property against the risks associated with a riot or civil 
commotion.256   
Now, assume that Liberty’s Premier Property ProtectorTM agreement also insures 
against riots and looting. Will the Southern District of New York force Liberty to 
pay business-interruption damages? The short and probable answer is no. An 
 
 251. Complaint ¶ 57, The Chef’s Warehouse Inc., 2020 WL 3444003. 
 252. See Survey of State Law Regarding Enforceability of Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses, TIMONEY 
KNOX, LLP (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.timoneyknox.com/insurance-industry/survey-of-state-law-regarding-
enforceability-of-anti-concurrent-causation-clauses. 
 253. See Bonner, supra note 246. 
 254. See generally, Noah Manskar & Natalie Musumeci, Looters Cost NYC Businesses ‘Tens of Millions,’ 
Experts Estimate, N.Y. POST (June 3, 2020, 8:01 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/06/03/looters-cost-nyc-
businesses-tens-of-millions-experts-estimate/ (reporting that citywide rampant looting and vandalism exploded 
in New York after George Floyd’s death); David Eads et al., Chicago Police Arrested More People for Protesting 
Than Looting In Early Days of Unrest, Contradicting City’s Claims, CHI. SUN TIMES (June 17, 2020), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/6/17/21294676/chicago-police-arrested-more-people-protesting-looting-
early-days-unrest-contradicting-claims; Alex Leary et al., Large Crowds Expected in Washington Saturday as 
George Floyd Protests Enter 12th Day, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/large-
crowds-expected-in-washington-saturday-as-george-floyd-protests-enter-12th-day-2020-06-06; Matt Hamilton 
et al., Looting In Van Nuys, Hollywood, As Curfew Begins in L.A. County, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-01/la-braces-for-another-night-of-protests (reporting that 
mass protests in California erupted after George Floyd’s death and about 10% of 700 arrestees were looters and 
burglars who ransacked businesses blocks away from peaceful protesters). 
 255. Complaint ¶ 28, 45, The Chef’s Warehouse Inc., 2020 WL 3444003. 
 256. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. 1971); see also Browse Home 
Coverage Options, LIBERTY MUT. INS., (2020), https://www.libertymutual.com/homeowners-insurance-
coverage (summarizing and comparing the types of covered perils that commonly appear in Liberty’s contracts); 
and Rosalie Donlon, Riots, Civil Commotion and Vandalism Generally Covered By Insurance, PROPERTY 
CASUALTY 360, (June 1, 2020), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2020/06/01/riots-civil-commotion-and-
vandalism-generally-covered-by-insurance/?slreturn=20200902093044. 




Deciphering Property Insurers’ Indemnification Obligations After Disasters, 
Pandemics and Business Interruption Losses 
 
38 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
insured’s stolen goods and business-interruption losses are different property 
interests. 257 One interest is tangible and the other is intangible.258 In the end, the 
commercial property insurers will probably pay the relatively inexpensive damages 
for looted or stolen property. But experts agree: For most insured small and high-end 
businesses, it will be difficult to prove convincingly the total market value and 
dominant cause of a business interruption loss.259  
V. A CASE STUDY— STATE SUPREME COURTS’ AND FEDERAL CIRCUITS’ 
DISPOSITIONS OF DUTY-TO-INDEMNIFY CLAIMS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CORONAVIRUS BUSINESS-LOSS DISPUTES  
After state governments issued lockdown or stay-at-home orders, many insured 
businessowners sought advice from insurance brokers and lawyers.260 Insureds 
wanted to know whether property insurers have a duty to cover COVID-19-related 
business-interruption losses.261 Seasoned attorneys’ opinions have been nearly 
unanimous: The specific facts or specific (fact)ors surrounding a specific business-
interruption dispute will probably determine whether courts force insurers to 
indemnify insureds.262 
Perhaps, that less-than-definitive answer will surprise most insurance consumers. 
But the opinion is rooted in settled law: In declaratory-judgment trials, courts must 
examine or weigh specific facts and perform a “case by case basis” analysis before 
declaring contractual rights or obligations.263 State supreme courts’ rulings are 
 
 257. Polytech, Inc., v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See generally, Wilkinson, supra note 219 (stating that there will be complications with calculating what 
business losses were caused by the rioting and looting and what business losses were caused by coronavirus). 
 260. See generally, Leslie Scism, Coronavirus Costs Weigh on Travelers’ Profit; Insurer Books $86 Million 
in Pandemic-Related Charges and Braces for Policyholder Litigation Over Business Losses, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 
21, 2020, 7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/travelers-posts-lower-profit-as-catastrophe-losses-rise-
11587469103 (reporting that many entrepreneurs have filed business-interruption coverage claims that could 
approximate “hundreds of billions of dollars”). 
 261. See, e.g., Paul S. White & Siobhán A. Breen, The Impact of The Global Covid-19 Pandemic on the 
Insurance Industry, DRI: FOR THE DEF. (Apr. 2020), 
https://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Attorney_Articles_PDFs/ftd-2004-white-breen.pdf (reporting that 
persons are questioning whether insurance covers businesses which have experienced the effects of COVID-19). 
 262. Id. at 29. 
 263. See, e.g., Marine Equip. Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir.1993) (requiring an 
examination of facts on a case-by-case basis in a declaratory judgment trial); Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Ins. 
Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 911 (Haw. 1994) (requiring a case-by-case basis analysis of relevant facts to 
decide insurers’ indemnification obligation); Northbrook Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. GEO Intern. Corp., 739 
N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (requiring a case-by-case basis analysis of relevant facts to decide a duty-to-
indemnify controversy) (emphasis added); and Lamar Co., LLC. v. Continental Cas. Co., No. CV-05-320-AAM, 
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equally clear regarding another matter: A factual analysis of a disputed contractual 
terms is more important than the application of rules, such as the ambiguity, 
reasonable expectation, four-corners, or plain-and-ordinary-meaning doctrine.264  
But the latter rule engenders another timely and important question: What are the 
“most relevant facts or factors?” Quite simply, courts have not fashioned or embraced 
a universal standard to identify the most probative evidence. However, after 
examining just six randomly selected federal circuits’ duty-to-indemnify 
declarations, a consistent finding emerged. The “most relevant and factors” are 
distributed among the following categories: Types of insured business entities, types 
of defendants, geographic locations of litigants and courts, types of insurance 
contracts, types of underlying first- and third-party injuries, types of property 
interests, types of property losses, types of common law and statutory claims, types 
of underlying theories of recovery, and types of insurance-specific affirmative 
defenses.265 
Significantly, seasoned insurance litigators have also suggested that these same 
sets of “relevant facts” probably will influence state and federal courts’ dispositions 
of coronavirus business-interruption and duty-to-indemnify controversies.266 
 
2006 WL 1210228, at *7 (E.D. Wash. May 4, 2006) (requiring a case-by-case basis analysis of relevant facts to 
decide a duty-to-indemnify dispute between an insured and insurer). 
 264. See, e.g., Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Oregon’s law 
and reaffirming that a duty-to-indemnify question requires both legal and factual analyses to determine if 
underlying probative facts establish insurance coverage) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); Am. States 
Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying Texas law and requiring legal or factual analysis 
of a duty-to-indemnify controversy); Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So.2d 528, 537 (Fla. 
2005) (stressing that case law may be informative, but an insurance agreement’s language is the “most important 
factor” when deciding whether coverage exists) (emphasis added); and Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co. v. Avent Am., 
Inc., 612 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2010) (stressing that factual allegations are more important than legal theories 
when deciding a duty-to-indemnify dispute) (emphasis added). 
 265. See, e.g., Sterngold Dental, LLC v. HDI Global Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019) (presenting the 
“relevant facts” as geographic location of litigants and courts and the type of insurance contract); French v. 
Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 696-97 (4th Cir. 2006) (presenting the “relevant facts” as the types of 
insurance contracts, types of property interests, and types of property losses); Fed. Ins. Co. v. CompUSA, Inc., 
319 F.3d 746, 747-749, 752 (5th Cir. 2003) (presenting the “relevant facts” as types of defendants, types of 
common law and statutory claims, and types of insurance-specific affirmative defenses); Maher v. Federated 
Serv. Ins. Co., 666 F. App’x 396, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2016) (presenting the “relevant facts” as types of insured 
business entities, types of insurance contracts, types of underlying first- and third-party injuries, and types of 
common law and statutory claims); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 832 F.3d 645, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(presenting the “relevant facts” as types of defendants and types of insurance-specific affirmative defenses); and 
Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 476 F.3d 620, 621-22, 626 (8th Cir. 2007) (presenting the “relevant facts” as 
types of defendants, geographic locations of litigations and courts, types of underlying first- and third-party 
injuries, types of underlying theories of recovery, and types of insurance-specific affirmative defenses). 
 266. See, e.g., Sean Mahoney & Ciaran Way, King’s Bench Petition Seeks to Consolidate All Pennsylvania 
COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance Cases, JD SUPRA (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/king-s-bench-petition-seeks-to-22336/ (suggesting that the following 




Deciphering Property Insurers’ Indemnification Obligations After Disasters, 
Pandemics and Business Interruption Losses 
 
40 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Uncertainty, however, still exists. As stated above, disputes are generally decided on 
a case-by-case basis. Therefore, to shed additional light on this important and timely 
topic, the author decided to complete and report the results of a duty-to-indemnify 
study and a business-interruption analysis that began in 2002.267 
A. Source of Data, Sampling Procedures and Relevant Attributes of Insurers 
and Insureds 
Following standard research methodologies, the author fashioned a simple null 
hypothesis: No statistically significant difference exists between property insurers 
and their insured businesspersons’ likelihood of winning duty-to-indemnify disputes 
in state and federal declaratory judgment trials. The alternative hypothesis is equally 
simple: “Relevant facts” or “extralegal factors”268 are more likely to explain any 
statistically significant difference between property insurers’ and their insureds’ 
probability of winning duty-to-indemnify disputes. 
The author searched law reporters as well as LEXISNEXIS and WESTLAW 
databases―attempting to uncover every reported and unreported duty-to-indemnify 
dispute that involved business-interruption as well as other insurance-related claims. 
The search generated approximately 4,250 decisions.269  
To secure a representative sample of duty-to-indemnify cases, the author crafted 
a narrower query which contained only the following phrases: “covered peril!,” 
“excluded peril!,” “covered property,” “civil authority order!,” “peril! insured 
against,” “property loss!,” and “business interruption.270 The second search produced 
just 209 decisions. Therefore, to secure a fairly sound database, a stratified random 
sample of the 4000-plus cases was executed. In the end, more than two-thousand 
declarations (N = 2,278) appeared in the database. However, the focus of this 
investigation centers on less than eight hundred declarations (N = 758). To create 
 
factors may affect courts’ COVID-19-related, indemnification decisions — “locations of plaintiffs and 
defendants,” “types of claimed business losses,” “material differences in business interruption[s],” the presence 
of a “viral contamination and/or pandemics”, “the facts of each particular business loss,” “the circumstances of 
each business interruption,” “the actual loss of each business” and “the nature of the insured’s business”) 
(emphasis added). 
 267. See Rice, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 268. See, e.g., Recent Publications, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2011) (reviewing and reporting an 
author’s empirical findings: “[The author employs] an expertise in political science and a robust understanding 
of legal analysis to illuminate the impact [of] extrajudicial institutional factors . . . on the ultimate merits decision 
of a case. . . . [The author] sketches a divided federal court system where . . . [appellate courts are] more 
sympathetic to the facts of a case than the policy-driven Supreme Court.” (emphasis added). 
 269. The restricted query was: adv: SY(duty /s indemnify) (visited last on July 21, 2020). 
 270. The exact search among the approximately 4,250 cases was: “peril! insured against” “covered peril!” 
“excluded peril!” “covered property,” “civil authority order!” “property loss!” “business interruption.” 
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multiple binary (0,1) or “dummy”271 variables or factors, a content analysis of each 
case was performed.272 Ultimately, the binary data were inserted into a large matrix. 
Various statistical procedures were applied to analyze the data. The results are 
displayed below in four tables.273 
B. “Relevant” Extralegal and Legal Factors Surrounding the Litigants 
TABLE 1 presents six categories of “specific, undisputed and relevant facts” about 
the insureds and insurers who commenced declaratory-judgment actions in state and 
federal courts. Those categories are: geographic origins of the lawsuits, types of 
insured business entities, types of “covered property” and “covered perils,” 




 271. See Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business 
Deadlock, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 223 n.54 (2014) (discussing probit analysis and the construction of binary 
(0,1) or “dummy variables”); and William H. Greene, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116-18 (Prentice Hall 5th ed. 
2003) (explaining the purpose and use of dummy variables in regression analysis). 
 272. See generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77 n.58, 88 n.103, 90-91 nn.111–12, 103 (2008) (presenting a history and description of 
Professor Rice’s published content and statistical analyses of common-law and statutory questions of law) 
(citations omitted); Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic 
Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2010–13 
(2013) (embracing and discussing content analysis); and Robert E. Mitchell, The Use of Content Analysis for 
Explanatory Studies, 31 Pub. Opinion Q. 230, 237 (1967). 
 273. An EXCEL database of the sampled cases as well as multiple STATA-PROGRAM working files —
containing statistical procedures, generated tables and various statistics —are stored at the author’s location 
and/or with this law journal’s office. 
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There are two columns of percentages. The left column appears under the heading, 
“State Trial Courts and Federal District Courts (N = 758). In the right column, the 
percentages appear under the heading, “State Appellate Courts and Federal Courts 
of Appeals.” After the trial and district courts issued 758 declarations, approximately 
70% of the insureds and insurers appealed adverse declarations to state and federal 
courts of appeals (N = 524).  
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Comparing the two distributions of percentages, some notable findings are 
revealed. First, the geographic regions274 of the proceedings and parties are relevant. 
Initially, trial and district courts in the Midwest and Southwest decided the majority 
of suits—23.3% and 32.1%, respectively. Subsequently, state and federal appellate 
courts in the Midwest and Southwest also resolved the majority of duty-to-indemnify 
disagreements. The respective percentages are 22.1% and 36.6%. 
TABLE 1 also describes the types of insured business entities that commenced 
declaratory judgment actions in trial and district courts. Three sets of complainants 
filed duty-to-indemnify claims — “financial service providers,” “providers of goods 
and non-financial services,” and “government contractors and providers.” Among 
the inferior state and federal courts, the respective percentages for the three groups 
are 59.9%, 22.8% and 17.3%. 
As discussed earlier, insurers sell a variety of property insurance contracts—
covering all types of tangible and intangible property interests as well as excluding 
all types of perils. But more significantly, each type of insuring agreement can 
generate duty-to-indemnify disputes.275 TABLE 1 displays three classes of insurance 
contracts which have produced duty-to-indemnify clashes in state and federal trial 
courts. They are all-risks-commercial, specific-risk-fire and other-specific-risks 
insurance agreements. The respective percentages are 34.0%, 45.8% and 20.1%. 
How do property insurers defend themselves in declaratory-judgment trials? 
Table 1 presents two categories of defenses. One category is labeled “Insurers’ 
Affirmative Defenses”—which comprises several insurance-specific defenses276 as 
well as the highly interrelated no-insurable-interest and no-coverage defenses.277 
Among state and federal trial courts, the percentages are 66.2%, 15.7% and 17.0%, 
respectively.  
Once more, before and after the mid-1980s, the insurance industry embraced 
respectively the absolute and total exclusion defenses—which preclude 
reimbursements for losses arising from contaminants, viruses and pollution.278 Some 
 
 274. “Eastern” includes Delaware, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania; “Midwestern” comprises Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; “Northeastern” includes 
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Puerto Rico, and Guam; “Southern” comprises 
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia; 
“Southwestern” includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; and, “Western” includes Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
 275. See supra notes 37–60 and accompanying text. 
 276. See generally Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316–17 (1927) (explaining the doctrine of 
uberrimae fidei or “utmost good faith” from which many insurance-specific defenses like concealment, 
misrepresentation, nondisclosure, breach of warranty and breach of condition evolved). 
 277. See Smith v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 448, 449-51 (Tex. 1963) (describing the types of insurable 
interests and the relationship between an insurable interest and insurance coverage). 
 278. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
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cases in the database were decided after the adoptions. Table 1 reveals that 
approximately half (48.4%) of the insurers raised the absolute exclusion defense and 
the remainder (51.6%) advanced the total exclusion defense.  
The last set of “relevant factors” in Table 1 appears under the heading, “Applied 
Doctrines of Interpretation.” Before state and federal trial courts, forty per cent 
(40.6%) of the litigants raised the reasonable expectation doctrine and encouraged 
courts to decide the duty-to-indemnify issue as a matter of law (AMOL). The 
remaining litigants asked the tribunals to apply the ambiguity doctrine, general rules 
of contract construction, or the plain-and-ordinary-meaning rule. The displayed 
percentages are 31.5%, 18.9% and 9.0%, respectively. 
Finally, Table 1 shows the dispositions of duty-to-indemnify disputes. Stated 
briefly, viewed from the insureds’ perspectives, state and federal trial courts are 
statistically and significantly more likely to rule against insureds and in favor of 
insurers. The reported “granted” and “denied” percentages are 47.9% and 
52.1%―respectively. Conversely, in state and federal courts of appeals, insureds are 
more likely to prevail in declaratory judgment proceedings. The respective 
percentages are 53.6% and 46.4%.  
C. A Bivariate Analysis of Factors Influencing the Award of Declaratory 
Relief 
So, why are some business entities more likely to win duty-to-indemnify 
controversies in appellate courts? To find the answer, consider the “relevant facts” 
or factors displayed in Table 2. First, consider the two columns of percentages that 
appear under the heading, “State Appellate Courts.” The statistically significant 
percentages indicate that key factors—insurers’ absolute “contaminant” exclusion 
provisions, the reasonable expectation doctrine, and the ambiguity doctrine—
increase insureds’ likelihood of winning duty-to-indemnify controversies in state 
appellate courts. The corresponding percentages are 60.2%, 65.5% and 61.2% ― 
respectively. 
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Now, consider the two columns of percentages that appear under the heading, 
Federal Appellate Courts. The findings uncover a completely different reality. 
Insurers are statistically and substantially more likely to prevail when 1) the insureds 
are “financial service providers” or “government contractors,” and 2) federal courts 
of appeals apply the reasonable expectation doctrine, traditional rules of contract 
construction, and the doctrine of plain and ordinary meaning. Respectively, the 
statistically significant percentages are 58.9%, 65.2%, 58.6% , 71.4% and 55.2%. 
Summarizing, Table 2 reveals: 1) Insureds are significantly more likely to win 
duty-to-indemnify arguments in state appellate courts; and 2) Insurers are more likely 
to prevail in federal courts of appeals. Therefore, answering the earlier question, 
insureds are statistically and substantially more likely to prevail in appellate courts 
when state courts decide the disputes. 
Finally, it is important to repeat an earlier disclosure. The sizable database for this 
study evolved over several years. Thus, some sampled cases are single-claim 
judgments—courts’ deciding whether an insurer must indemnify when a single 
underlying legal claim is present.279 Others are mixed-actions and mixed-claims 
 
 279. See, e.g., Salomon v. Philadelphia Ins. Companies, No. 13-10378-DPW, 2014 WL 294320, at *9 (D. 
Mass. Jan. 23, 2014) (declaring that the insurer had no duty to indemnify because the underlying conflict involved 
“a single claim.”). 
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judgments280—which concomitantly resolved duty-to-indemnify, duty-to-settle281 
and duty-to-defend282 controversies.  
Table 2 also highlights the bivariate relationships between “relevant factors” and 
the dispositions of duty-to-indemnify controversies which arise from underlying 
single and mixed-claims lawsuits. The last four rows of percentages reveal the 
influences of underlying mixed-claims on state and federal appellate courts’ 
dispositions of duty-to-indemnify disagreements. Generally, when state and federal 
courts of appeals weigh the concurrent and simultaneous effects of multiple and 
mixed-underlying claims, property insurers are substantially more likely to prevail. 
And a careful review of the respective percentages in Table 2 will support this 
conclusion.  
Although admittedly not directly on point, the latter finding does not bode well 
for businessowners who are likely to raise a concurrent causation argument in 
business-interruption trials. Again, insurance experts have maintained: Coronavirus 
orders and “riotous conduct” are concurrent causes of massive business closures and 
interruptions.283 But, as the findings suggest, appellate courts are less likely to force 
insurers to indemnify when insureds raise multiple and mixed allegations to justify a 
favorable declaration of contractual rights. 
D. A Bivariate Analysis of State Supreme and Appellate Courts’ Dispositions 
of Duty to Indemnify Clashes in Declaratory Judgment Proceedings 
Again, insureds are substantially more like to win duty-to-indemnify disputes in 
state appellate courts. But there are intermediate and supreme courts. So, are insured 
businesses more likely to win duty-to-indemnify disputes in intermediate or supreme 
courts? The origin of this timely question evolved from Texas Supreme Court 
justices’ contentious majority and minority opinions in McGinnes Industrial 
Maintenance Corp. v. Phoenix Insurance Co..284 
In McGinnes, the insured and insurer were “sophisticated” corporate 
enterprises.285 The Environmental Protection Agency sued McGinnes for allegedly 
 
 280. See, e.g., Maxum Indem. Co. v. Eclipse Mfg. Co., 848 F.Supp.2d 871, 884 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2012) 
(reaffirming that an insurer has no duty to indemnify all parties in an underlying mixed-multiple-claims lawsuit). 
 281. See, e.g., Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. and Surety Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(refusing to expand a duty-to-indemnify obligation to cover third parties’ claims in an underlying mixed-action 
settlement). 
 282. See, e.g., Pac. Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 766 (3d Cir. 1985) (declaring the duty to indemnify 
follows the duty to defend and requiring multiple insurers to settle an underlying multiple-theories-of-liability 
lawsuit) (emphasis added). 
 283. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 284. 477 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. 2015). 
 285. Id. at 789–90. 
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violating the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).286 McGinnes argued that its all-risks insurance 
contract required Phoenix to defend and indemnify the company against the 
CERCLA-contamination suit.287 Citing a Texas appellate court’s opinion, four 
dissenting supreme-court justices argued that Texas’s “pro-business climate” would 
be severely undermined if Phoenix were forced to defend McGinnes.288 
The McGinnes majority acknowledged: California, Illinois, and Maine supreme 
courts declared that insurers are not obligated to indemnify and defend similarly 
situated companies against a CERCLA suit.289 Still, the Texas Supreme Court 
majority rejected the Texas Appellate Court’s and McGinnes minority justices’ 
“anti-business climate” concerns.290 Citing the decisions of the highest courts in 
Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Vermont and Wisconsin, the 
McGinnes majority declared that Phoenix had a contractual duty to defend McGinnes 
against the CERCLA-contamination suits.291  
Now, in light of the revelations in McGinnes, consider a restatement of the earlier 
question: Are states’ “business climate rankings”292 more or less likely to influence 
the dispositions of duty-to-indemnify and concomitant mixed-claims disputes? Table 
3 displays the fifteen most populous states 293—which are ranked according to their 
purportedly “objective levels of support” for businesses. Study the first three rows of 
percentages. In intermediate appellate courts, insureds are significantly and 
statistically more likely to prevail, if their state has an “excellent” or a “poor” 
business climate ranking. The respective percentages are 56.5% and 54.9%. 
Conversely, insured business entities are less likely to prevail (45.2%) if their states 
have a “good” business environment.  
Of course, regardless of a state’s level of support for businesses, the findings in 
Table 3 suggest: State supreme courts generally decide duty-to-indemnify quarrels 
 
 286. Id. at 790. 
 287. Id. at 792–93. 
 288. Id. at 796 n. 7 (citing Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 163, 177 
(Tex. App. 2002) (“Industry and commerce cannot operate in a climate that allows a contracting party who makes 
a bad bargain to change the terms of a deal at its option.”). 
 289. Id. at 793 n. 35. 
 290. McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phx. Ins. Co., 477 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex. 2015). 
 291. Id. at 793 n. 34. 
 292. These rankings are based on publicly available government statistics, forty-six research organizations’ 
statistical reports and data from each state’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. The rankings are average 
rankings—covering 14 years between 2007 and 2020. See CNBC.com staff, America’s Top States for Business 
in 2019, CNBC (Jan. 27, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/americas-top-states-for-business-
2019.html; CNBC.com staff, Top States Past Year Rankings, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/top-states-past-
year-rankings/. 
 293. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
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in favor of insured businesses. The percentages are 55.6%, 52.6% and 55.0%, 
respectively. Yet, in McGinnes, the Texas Supreme Court examined just a few 
supreme-court cases and discovered split decisions—admittedly surrounding a duty-
to-defend issue.294 Do states’ “business climate rankings” contribute to split judicial 
decisions? The answer is a qualified yes. 
Consider the seven rows of percentages in Table 3 which appear next to the 
subheading, Court Located in Large “Excellent Business Climate” States. Without 
a doubt, the business environments in Texas, North Carolina, Georgia and New 
Jersey have been consistently superb. In those four states, intermediate and supreme 
courts are statistically and significantly more likely to decide duty-to-indemnify and 
related disputes in favor of insured businesses. The percentages for both levels of 
each state’s judiciary range from 55.9% to 75.0%. 
 
 
 294. McGinnes, 477 S.W.3d at 794 (re-emphasizing the importance of uniformity when various jurisdictions 
interpret identical insurance provisions but acknowledging that the current decision cannot achieve uniformity 
since “courts have already split”). 
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To be sure, the remaining three states’ business environments are equally 
outstanding. Yet, the intermediate and supreme courts in Virginia and Florida are 
statistically and markedly more likely to decide against insured business enterprises. 
The percentages range from 52.3% to 66.7%. Intermediate courts in Massachusetts 
are also considerably more likely (55.0%) to decide against insureds. However, 
although the finding is not statistically significant, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
is slightly more likely (51.9%) to decide in favor of businesspersons. 
Now, review the four rows of percentages in Table 3 which appear next to the 
subheading, Court Located in Large “Good Business Climate” States. Surprisingly, 
like their sisters in Virginia and Florida, the intermediate courts in California and 
Iowa are statistically and significantly more likely to decide against insured 
businesses. The percentages are 59.1% and 61.1%, respectively. However, before 
California and Iowa Supreme Courts, businesspersons’ have equal probabilities of 
prevailing—52.4% and 50.0%, respectively.  
Most certainly, Pennsylvania and Illinois also have “good” business 
environments. But the courts in those two jurisdictions respond very differently to 
insured businesses’ duty-to-indemnify claims. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and 
its courts of appeals consistently decide against insureds—57.1% and 62.9%, 
respectively. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Illinois and its appeals courts reliably 
interpret duty-to-indemnify provisions in favor of insured sellers of goods and 
services. The percentages are 68.2% and 53.3%, respectively. 
Finally, among “poor business climate states,” litigants’ win/loss trends vary 
considerably. For example, the New York Court of Appeals and Louisiana Supreme 
Court are more likely to decide indemnification arguments in favor of insured 
companies and small businesses—66.7% and 64.7%, respectively. And the 
intermediate courts in Louisiana and Alabama are also statistically and significantly 
more likely to rule in favor of insureds—53.3% and 80.6%, respectively. On the other 
hand, Michigan Supreme Court and its intermediate courts are less likely to rule in 
favor of insured commercial entities. The percentages are 52.2% and 57.8%, 
respectively. 
E. Two-Stage Multivariate Probit Analysis — The Effects of “Relevant 
Facts” on the Outcome of Indemnification Claims in State and Federal 
Courts 
Earlier, we discovered that several interrelated indemnification questions 
persistently generate judicial splits: 1) whether a virus, contaminant or civil-authority 
order can physically destroy or damage a tangible property, 2) whether a virus, 
contaminant or civil-authority order can cause business-interruption losses, and 3) 
whether an insurer must indemnify an insured when a virus, contaminant or civil-
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authority order causes a business loss.295 Debatably, these unyielding splits will have 
major implications for the dispositions of COVID-19-related, business-interruption 
disputes in state and federal courts. 
Up to now, we have reviewed several bivariate relationships between certain 
“relevant facts” and duty-to-indemnify outcomes. Perhaps, these bivariate findings 
explain in part the judicial conflicts. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable: Statistically 
significant bivariate-relationships do not prove that certain “relevant facts” cause 
judicial splits or that courts have certain pro-insured or pro-insurer “predispositions.”  
As explained elsewhere, to increase the validity as well as the explanatory, 
inferential and predictive power of one’s research findings, two central questions 
must be answered: 1) whether a sample of only reported judicial decisions accurately 
and fully describes supreme and appellate courts’ tendency to grant or deny 
declaratory relief296 and 2) whether courts only allow certain “relevant factors” and 
legal doctrines to determine the outcome of disputes.297 Arguably, case-study 
findings are more reliable and predictive when researchers 1) test for “selectivity 
bias” in the sample,298 2) use more “powerful” inferential statistics, and 3) measure 
the exclusive, collective and concurrent effects of multiple “relevant factors” on the 
dispositions of disputes. 
 A test for “selectivity bias” is required for numerous reasons. After receiving 
adverse rulings in lower courts, some litigants accept the declarations and decide not 
to seek appellate review. Other litigants, however, refuse to accept the trial courts’ 
unfavorable rulings and challenge those decisions in state or federal appellate courts. 
 
 295. See generally supra notes 95-213 and accompanying text. 
 296. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether Liability Insurers Must 
Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal 
and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments 1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1208–09 (1998) (explaining the 
inferential limitations associated with a researcher’s analyzing reported decisions and using only simple 
percentages to explain judicial outcomes and stressing that unreported decisions must be included in the 
statistical analysis) (emphasis added); and Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions over 
Whether Insurers Must Defend Insureds that Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and 
Empirical Review of Federal and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900-2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1088–
89 nn. 43–32 (2000). 
 297. See supra note 292. 
 298. The computation of this statistical test and its relevance have been discussed elsewhere. 
See G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 257–71, 278–83 
(1983) (discussing “self-selectivity bias” and “other-selectivity bias”); Willy E. Rice, Unconscionable Judicial 
Disdain for Unsophisticated Consumers and Employees’ Contractual Rights?―Legal and Empirical Analyses 
of Courts’ Mandatory Arbitration Rulings and the Systematic Erosion of Procedural and Substantive 
Unconscionability Defenses Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 1800-2015, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 229 n. 
560 (2016); and Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and 
Historical Analysis of Courts’ Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency 
Statutes with the McCarran-Ferguson Act-1941-1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 446-49 nn. 213–19 (1994). 
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The “selectivity bias” question, therefore, becomes whether a difference exists 
between litigants who “decide to appeal” and those who “decide not to appeal.” If 
the test indicates a statistically significant difference between the two groups, a 
researcher can reasonably conclude that diverse characteristics—rather than certain 
“relevant factors”—explain appealers’ likelihood of prevailing or losing in courts of 
appeals.  
Again, the present database contains multiple “relevant facts” about litigants who 
appealed adverse duty-to-indemnify declarations. The author, therefore, performed a 
multivariate, Search Term End two-staged probit analysis.299 This statistical 
procedure tests for “selectivity bias” and determines the unique, collective and 
concurrent effects of multiple extralegal and legal factors on the dispositions of duty-
to-indemnify disputes in state and federal appellate court.300 
 
 299. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions over Whether Insurers Must Defend 
Insureds that Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1088-89 nn. 431–32 (2000); Willy 
E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ 
Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1208–09 n. 386–87 (1998). See also Willy 
E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove 
City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 287 nn. 406–09 (1986). 
 300. See supra note 295. 
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Table 4 presents the results of a multivariate-probit analysis—focusing on 591 
appellate and supreme courts duty-to-indemnify cases in the sample.301 Seven (7) 
classes of “relevant facts” are illustrated. Also, two distributions of probit values—
along with their respective robust standard errors—appear in the table.  
 
 301. TABLE 4 at the bottom provides an explanation of the difference between the “original” N=524 in Table 
1 and the N=591 in Table 4. 
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The asterisks describe the probit values’ levels of statistical significance.302 First, 
examine the probit values which appear under the caption Litigants Who Decided to 
Appeal Adverse Declaratory Judgments. Those coefficients answer the question: 
whether or not the “relevant factors” independent, combined and simultaneous 
effects significantly influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal adverse duty-to-
indemnify rulings. 
Some of the probit values are statistically significant—strongly indicating that 
some factors influenced litigants’ decisions more than others. For example, litigants 
who resided in Southern states and the Seventh Circuit were less likely to appeal 
adverse rulings. The respective negative coefficients are -.9410 and -.4274. 
Conversely, purely state-court litigants and those residing in “poor business 
environment states” were more likely to appeal unfavorable declarations. The 
positive probit coefficients are 2.670 and 1.040, respectively.  
Still, the dominant question remains: Whether or not “selectivity bias” appears in 
the sample. Or, stated differently, are there noteworthy differences between litigants 
who decided to appeal and those who decided not to appeal? To find the answer, a 
“test for similarities” between two equations—the two distributions of probit 
values—was required. At the bottom of Table 4, a Wald test for independent 
equations appears. The Chi-square value is not statistically significant and suggests: 
No significant self-selection or other-selection bias exists in the sample.  
Consider an even more challenging question: Whether the independent, 
concurrent and simultaneous effects of the seven classes predictors influence 
appellate courts’ dispositions of duty-to-indemnify disputes. And the short answer 
is, yes. Review the probit values in Table 4 under the heading DISPOSITIONS OF 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS DISPOSITIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE 
COURTS. Ten (10) of the “relevant factors” have statistically significant probit 
values. Examine them extremely carefully. Put simply, barring one factor, the 
positive probit coefficients increase insured business entities’ likelihood of winning 
duty-to-indemnify disputes in declaratory-judgment hearings. 
More specifically, the first statistically significant probit coefficient (.2699) 
suggests that insureds who sell goods and non-financial services are more likely to 
win duty-to-indemnify disputes than other insureds. In addition, insureds are 
substantially more likely to prevail in appellate courts that are located in southern, 
southwestern and western states. The probit coefficients are .4631, .5628 and 
.3218—respectively. And, to underscore the influence of federal courts’ geographic 
locations on insureds’ likelihood of success, consider the next cluster of statistically 
 
 302. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis 
of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 100 n.144 (2011) (reporting probit 
coefficients, t-statistics, standard errors, and the marginal effects of independent and control predictors on 
individuals’ likelihood of voting, and the representative indicators for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical 
significance). 
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significant coefficients. Respectively, the positive .4820 and .9230 values indicate 
that insureds are more likely to prevail in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. On the 
other hand, the negative coefficient (-.3291) suggests that insured businesses are less 
likely to win duty-to-indemnify disputes in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. 
Once more, after governors reported a “coronavirus pandemic” and forced “non-
essential” public and private operations to cease in March 2020, business-
interruption claims soared.303 But an overwhelming majority of property insurers 
refused to indemnify insured businessowners— proclaiming confidently that “all-
risks” insurance contracts do not cover business-interruption losses and stating 
unapologetically that courts would agree.304  
Now, review the negative -.3063 and -.1262 coefficients under the sub-heading, 
“Disputed First-Party Insurance Contracts.” Although they are not statistically 
significant, they support the insurers’ position. Insureds are less likely to prevail 
when “all-risks” and “specified business risks” property insurance provisions 
generate duty-to-indemnify disagreements. In contrast, insureds are statistically and 
substantially more likely to prevail when the dispute involves a duty-to-indemnify 
clause in a “specified property risk” insurance contract, or when insureds file single 
actions rather than class actions. The positive coefficients are .6884 and .5519, 
respectively. 
The last five rows of coefficients in Table 4 are arguably the most enlightening, 
surprising and important findings. Why? Again, it is important to remember that a 
multivariate two-stage probit analysis is an extremely powerful statistical test that 
answers a basis question: What is the unique effect of a single fact or factor on a 
court’s decision, when controlling for sample-selection bias as well as for the 
collective, concurrent and multiple effects of other factors?305  
Examine closely the two factors that appear under the sub-heading, “States’ 
Business-Climate Rankings.” The positive .2305 probit coefficient is statistically 
significant. And it strongly indicates: After controlling for the concurrent and 
multiple influences of every other factor in Table 4, courts in exceedingly pro-
business states are substantially more likely to decide duty-to-indemnify disputes in 
favor of insured small businesses, property owners and entrepreneurs. In early 2020, 
 
 303. See generally Brett Carey et al., 3 Ways Insurance Companies Can Navigate the Surge of COVID-19 
Business Interruption Claims, RISK & INS. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://riskandinsurance.com/3-ways-insurance-
companies-can-navigate-the-surge-of-covid-19-business-interruption-claims/. 
 304. Cf. Christopher J. Boggs, Coronavirus (COVID-19): Does Business Income Respond?, INS. J. (Mar. 24, 
2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/big-i-insights/2020/03/24/562253.htm (stating emphatically 
that all-risk insurance contracts do not cover business closures arising from the coronavirus and that insureds 
cannot satisfy courts’ stringent “coverage” test). 
 305. See supra notes 292–93 and accompanying text. 
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the “top thirteen pro-business states” were Virginia, Texas, North Carolina, Utah, 
Washington, Georgia, Minnesota, Nebraska, Colorado, Ohio, Indiana, Florida and 
Tennessee.306 Of course, the next probit coefficient (.0598) is not statistically 
significant. However, it is positive—suggesting that insured business entities are 
more likely to prevail even if the courts are located in the “poorest business climate 
states.” 307 
Finally, many practitioners believe or insist that courts’ application of settled legal 
theories and equitable doctrines determine the dispositions of duty-to-indemnify and 
other legal disputes.308 But seasoned judges continually remind both plaintiffs’ and 
defendants that commonsensical analyses of “relevant facts”—on a case-by-case 
basis—determine the outcomes of legal disputes.309 Put simply, the last three probit 
coefficients in Table 4 are instructive and support judges’ keen insight. Insurers’ 
“total contamination exclusion defense,” the general rules of contract construction, 
and the plain-and-ordinary-meaning doctrine have no statistically significant effects 
on the dispositions of duty-to-indemnify claims. The positive and negative probit 
coefficients are .1923, .0938, and -.0198, respectively. 
VI. SUMMARY-CONCLUSION 
For many small-to-large businessowners in the United States, the “unimaginable 
happened” in mid-March 2020.310 In the wake of a “novel coronavirus pandemic,” 
numerous governors issued stay-at-home orders.311 Consequently, the mandates 
interrupted nearly every commercial, industrial, and professional enterprise’s “non-
essential” operations.312 Purportedly, trillions of dollars will be required to cover the 
enormous business-interruption losses.313  
 
 306. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 307. In early 2020, those states were Delaware, Kentucky, Vermont, New Mexico, Arkansas, Oklahoma, 
Maine, West Virginia, Louisiana, Alaska, Mississippi, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. See supra note 288 and 
accompanying text. 
 308. Cf. TPM Holdings, Inc. v. Intra–Gold Indus. Inc., 91 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that a “judgment 
is made case by case, based on [certain] factors”); Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Finance Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950–
51 (5th Cir. 1997) (embracing the court’s position in TPM Holdings); and Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mex. 
Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 678 (5th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming the holdings in TPM Holdings and Save Power). 
 309. See supra note 304. 
 310. See, e.g., Jenn Ruiz, Boosting Your Resume: Tips to Maximize Your Job Hunt During COVID-19, SALLIE 
MAE (May 5, 2020), https://www.salliemae.com/blog/bolster-skills-online/ (reporting that the “unimaginable 
happened[:]” a record seven million Americans became unemployed in the wake of COVID-19-related business 
closures). 
 311. See White & Breen, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Winck, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Sams, supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, many shuttered businesses’ financial losses were exacerbated two 
months later—following the death of George Floyd.”314 Responding to Floyd’s death 
and to assertedly “unnecessarily abusive police tactics,” massive and peaceful 
demonstrations occurred in cities and towns across the United States.315 And, to be 
sure, some “errant and opportunistic” demonstrators needlessly looted, vandalized 
and destroyed all types of closed businesses.316  
Citing language in their insurance contracts and asserting that the coronavirus and 
looting independently or concurrently caused their loss profits, insureds are asking 
property insurers to indemnify. The overwhelming majority of insurers have 
refused—substantially aggravating the arguably dire emotional and financial statuses 
of many already-twice-harmed businessowners across the county.317 In response, 
insureds have filed more than one hundred coronavirus lawsuits in federal and state 
courts—which are scattered from California and Texas to Ohio, Pennsylvania, New 
York, Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia and North Carolina.318  
In a nutshell, insureds are alleging that the coronavirus and government orders are 
“perils insured against”—thus requiring insurers to pay business-loss damages.319 
 
 314. See Manskar & Musumeci, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 315. See also Maanvi Singh & Nina Lakhani, George Floyd Killing: Peaceful Protests Sweep America as 
Calls for Racial Justice Reach New Heights, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/jun/06/protests-george-floyd-black-lives-matter-saturday. 
 316. See Miranda Bryant, George Floyd Protesters Condemn ‘Opportunistic’ Looting and Violence, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 31, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/31/george-floyd-protesters-
condemn-opportunistic-looting-violence. 
 317. See Bruno et al., supra note 15 (reporting that “even before policyholders submitted any claims,” the 
insurance industries preemptively argued that property-insurance contracts do not cover COVID-19-related 
claims). 
 318. See generally COVID-19: Insurance Litigation and Regulatory Responses, ALSTON & BIRD, 
https://www.alston.com/en/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/04/20200419-updateCOVID19-business-
interruption-50-st.pdf (last updated Apr. 19, 2020) (providing information on “the legislative activities, 
regulatory guidance, and court filings related to business interruption coverage for COVID19 related claims”); 
Lyle Adriano, VA Restaurant Sues Insurer Over Denial of COVID-19 Business Interruption Claim, INS. BUS. 
AM. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/hospitality/va-restaurant-sues-insurer-
over-denial-of-covid19-business-interruption-claim-220462.aspx; Terrence Doyle, Legal Sea Foods Is Suing Its 
Insurer for Denying Its Coronavirus Claim, EATER BOSTON (May 5, 2020, 11:56 AM), 
https://boston.eater.com/2020/5/5/21247972/legal-seafoods-suing-insurer-denying-coronavirus-claim; and CBS 
17 Digital Desk, Durham Restaurants File Lawsuit Saying Insurance Company Won’t Honor Business 
Interruption Policies, CBS17, https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/durham-county-news/durham-
restaurants-file-lawsuit-saying-insurance-company-wont-honor-business-interruption-policies (last updated 
May 19, 2020, 5:48 AM). 
 319. See also Robert L. Wallan et al., Many Commercial Property Insurance Policies Provide Coverage for 
COVID-19 Exposures, PILLSBURY (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-
insights/commercial-property-insurance-covid-19.html. See generally Brett Carey et al., 3 Ways Insurance 
Companies Can Navigate the Surge of COVID-19 Business Interruption Claims, RISK & INS. (Apr. 16, 2020), 
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But, once more, it is important to stress: A coronavirus business-interruption dispute 
is essentially a duty-to-indemnify controversy.320 Even more importantly, courts 
have a long history of deciding this type of indemnification dispute when 
“pollutants,” “contaminants,” or “viruses” have allegedly caused lost profits.321  
Debatably, beginning in March 2020, three “covered perils” in all-risks insurance 
contracts “harmed” insured businessowners—coronavirus business-closure orders, 
“opportunistic looters and vandals,” and  insurers who acted in “bad faith” by 
summarily rejecting insureds’ business-interruption claims without investigating the 
merits.322 In light of these developments, the author decided to complete a case 
study—sampling and evaluating multiple “novel coronavirus” pleadings, selecting a 
representative sample of traditional duty-to-indemnify decisions, and applying a 
binary-coding scheme to evaluate purportedly “relevant facts” and their effects on 
supreme and appellate courts’ dispositions of duty-to-indemnity disputes.  
To summarize, the findings in this presentation will be exceedingly good news 
for insureds whose businesses were looted and vandalized. Property insurers will 
gladly cover those relatively small and inexpensive losses, because the risks—”civil 
commotion, riots or vandalism”—that caused the tangible losses  are “covered 
perils.”323 In addition, businesses that purchased a specific-risk property insurance 
contract should also experience little difficulty securing lost-profit damages.  
 
https://riskandinsurance.com/3-ways-insurance-companies-can-navigate-the-surge-of-covid-19-business-
interruption-claims/ (suggesting that insurers should monitor legislative responses that would make insurers 
cover business interruption claims). 
 320. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Eng’g Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124 (Cal. App. Ct. 
1970) (reaffirming that the purpose of business interruption insurance is to indemnify an insured whose property 
causes lost profits). 
 321. See Bruno et al., supra note 15 (documenting that courts have penned legion of decisions regarding the 
relationship between a physical property loss and a virus or bacteria). 
 322. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 62, Sandy Point Dental PC v. The Cincinnati Indem. Co., No. 1:20-cv-02160, 
2020 WL 1684205 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 6, 2020) (providing that Society Insurance allegedly acted in bad faith under 
Illinois statute by refusing to indemnify after the submission of a coronavirus business interruption claim and 
before conducting reasonable investigations). 
 323. See Marianne Bonner, Property Coverage for Riots, Vandalism, and Civil Commotion, THE BALANCE 
SMALL BUSINESS, https://www.thebalancesmb.com/property-coverage-for-riots-462690 (Nov. 8, 2018); Reed 
Smith Client Alerts, Insurance coverage for damage due to riots, civil commotion, and vandalism, REED SMITH 
(June 18, 2020), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2020/06/insurance-coverage-for-damage-due-to-
riots-civil-commotion-and-
vandalism#:~:text=Most%20commercial%20property%20insurance%20policies,are%20covered%20unless%2
0specifically%20excluded; see also Riots & Car Insurance— Are Policyholders Covered If Their Cars Are 
Destroyed?, ACCESSWIRE (June 1, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://www.accesswire.com/592211/Riots-Car-
Insurance—Are-Policyholders-Covered-If-Their-Cars-Are-Destroyed (“Businesses across the country suffered 
destruction over the weekend as protesters unleashed their anger over the death of George Floyd on commercial 
enterprises— from the offices of major multinational corporations to local, family-owned small shops. . . . Many 
may wonder who pays for the damage caused by rioting and civil unrest. . . . On a ‘standard’ personal auto policy, 
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On the other hand, there is less-encouraging news for businessowners who alleged 
that government coronavirus orders and looting were the concurrent causes of the 
owners’ loss profits. Put simply, business entities are extremely less likely to prevail 
if their insurance contracts contain an anti-concurrent causation exclusion. Even 
more notably, if insureds’ business operations are located or incorporated beyond the 
“top-13, pro-business climate” or “bottom-13 business friendly” states, both federal 
and state courts are substantially more likely to decide duty-to-indemnify disputes in 
favor of insurers. 
Again, courts frequently stress that the “relevant facts” surrounding a controversy 
are more important than the application of settled legal doctrines. Nevertheless, the 
statistically significant findings discussed above, strongly suggest: Some “relevant” 
facts or factors are more important, probative, dispositive or persuasive than others 
in courts of equity and law. Unquestionably, a state’s “objective” business-climate 
ranking is an exceptional factor that courts weigh—perhaps wittingly and unwittingly 
when deciding business disputes.  
Thus, the single message is simple: Arguably, thrice-harmed businessowners can 
increase their likelihood of winning duty-to-indemnify lawsuits in state supreme 
courts. But, to achieve that goal, insured small businesses must 1) respect the various 
legal barriers discussed in this presentation, 2) discover and understand their states’ 
“business climate rankings,” and 3) weigh carefully their states’ “business climate 
rankings” as well as other “relevant factors” outlined in this article—before filing a 
business-interruption suit in this “age of the coronavirus pandemic.”  
 
 
the vehicle’s comprehensive coverage covers damage caused by riot and civil unrest, just is it does for vandalism 
or theft.”). 
